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ARTICLES
ELIMINATING THE FUGITIVE
DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE IN
IMMIGRATION MATTERS
Tania N. Valdez*
Federal courts of appeals have declared that they may dismiss immigration
appeals filed by noncitizens who are deemed “fugitives.” The fugitive disentitlement
doctrine emerged in the criminal context with respect to defendants who had escaped
from physical custody. Although the doctrine originated out of concerns that court
orders could not be enforced against criminal fugitives, the doctrine has since crept into
civil contexts, including immigration. But rather than invoking the doctrine for its
originally intended purpose of ensuring that court orders could be enforced, courts now
primarily invoke it for the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and protecting the
dignity of the courts.
This Article makes three primary contributions to existing literature. First, it
describes how the fugitive disentitlement doctrine migrated from criminal proceedings
to civil immigration proceedings, analyzing the circuit courts’ explanations for the
doctrine’s expansion. Second, this Article explains why the courts’ justifications do not
actually translate as directly to immigration cases as it may seem. Moreover, the courts
have failed to adequately consider that their inherent powers are limited, including by
noncitizens’ constitutional rights and the principle of reasonableness. Third, this
Article argues that courts have not adequately considered the unique nature of
immigration proceedings, most saliently the importance of judicial review of agency
action in this context. Further, the doctrine is a lens through which judicial power, the
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balance between the courts and the agencies, and U.S. legal institutions’ view on
immigration can be examined.
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INTRODUCTION
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is a judicially created
procedure by which a court can dismiss a case without considering the
merits. The early cases invoking this doctrine, which developed in the
criminal appellate context, explained the Supreme Court’s concern
that orders could not be enforced against people convicted of crimes
who had escaped the physical custody of the state during the pendency
of their appeals. 1
Proponents of fugitive disentitlement, including the federal
courts, justify its use through several rationales. The main reasons are:
enforceability of court orders when the individual cannot be located;
that a person should not be able to avail themselves of access to the
courts if the person is a fugitive; deterring others from escaping and
encouraging voluntary surrenders; and promoting the efficient,
dignified operation of the courts. 2 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine was later expanded to civil cases, including review of immigration
appeals. 3 A basic Westlaw search reveals that there are seventy-two
circuit court cases discussing fugitive disentitlement in immigration
matters. 4 Although the number of cases dismissed pursuant to the
doctrine is currently small, its impact is far-reaching. The doctrine has
been used to dismiss petitions filed by longtime lawful permanent
residents of the United States, 5 asylum-seekers, 6 and parents of U.S.
citizens, 7 among numerous others. Fugitive disentitlement has been
acknowledged as a doctrine applicable to immigration cases by nine of
the federal courts of appeals. 8
1 See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
2 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824 (1996).
3 Technically, the process of raising a challenge of a BIA order to the circuit courts
is not called an “appeal,” but rather a “petition for review.” Nonetheless, this Article
occasionally uses the word “appeal” as shorthand.
4 This is based on a Westlaw search on March 1, 2021, of the phrase “fugitive
disentitlement doctrine,” limiting jurisdiction to “federal courts of appeals,” and selecting
the “immigration” practice area.
5 Bright v. Holder, 649 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011).
6 Qian Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2007); Dembele v. Gonzales, 168 F.
App’x 106 (7th Cir. 2006).
7 Chang Bin Guo v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 276 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2008).
8 See Gao, 481 F.3d at 176; Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1982); Bright, 649
F.3d at 399–400; Shigui Dong v. Holder, 426 F. App’x 418, 419–20 (6th Cir. 2011);
Sapoundjiev v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2004); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d
513, 516 (8th Cir. 2007); Wenqin Sun v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 2009); Martin
v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2008); Xiang Feng Zhou v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
290 F. App’x 278, 280–81 (11th Cir. 2008).
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To bring this topic to life, let us consider a real case where the
government sought dismissal based on the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine. 9 Mr. A came to the United States more than ten years ago as
a lawful permanent resident. He has been diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. During a mental health crisis,
he was arrested and criminally charged. In criminal court, Mr. A was
found incompetent and could not continue with his case for months,
until his competency was restored enough to work with his public
defender. Soon after he pled guilty and was credited with time served,
Mr. A was transferred directly to immigration custody and placed into
removal proceedings. The immigration judge found him competent
to represent himself. Proceeding pro se, Mr. A lost his lawful
permanent resident status and was denied every form of relief for
which he applied.
After losing his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), he filed a petition for review with a federal court of appeals. Mr.
A also filed a motion for a stay of removal with the circuit court, based
on his fear of being tortured due to his mental illness and the lack of
availability of his psychotropic medication in his country of origin. The
circuit court denied the motion for a stay. Still fearing deportation,
Mr. A refused to sign the travel paperwork presented by his
deportation officer. Due to his refusal, and regardless of the fact that
he had been diagnosed with a serious mental illness and remained in
immigration custody where he had been for two years, the government
filed a motion to dismiss Mr. A’s entire case before the circuit court,
on the grounds that he—while in ICE’s physical custody—was a
“fugitive.” 10
This case raises serious questions about the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine. How should “fugitive” be defined? How much discretion
should adjudicatory bodies have to “control their dockets” in the name
of dignity of the court? Does dismissal of a case based on the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine comport with even the minimal constitutional
protections that apply in removal proceedings? Should the fact that
Mr. A was mentally ill and feared persecution and torture in his
country of origin have affected the government’s decision to file the
motion to dismiss, or the court’s decision to entertain it? Was
entertaining the motion to dismiss “efficient” in terms of controlling
the circuit court’s docket, where it delayed the briefing schedule and
9 This case is currently being litigated by the author. The journal’s editors have
verified this case’s information with documents on file with the author, but the case
information is not included here to protect Mr. A’s anonymity.
10 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals never ruled on the motion to dismiss. It
remained pending for several months until the government filed a motion to withdraw, as
Mr. A had been deported.
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likely pushed oral argument back by six months? Was such “efficiency”
fair to Mr. A, where the government succeeded in delaying proceedings enough for Mr. A to be deported (to the country where he feared
persecution) while his case remained pending?
This Article tracks the doctrinal creep of fugitive disentitlement
into immigration matters and exposes the shortcomings of federal
courts’ justifications for doing so. 11 There is somewhat sparse
scholarship on the specific topic of fugitive disentitlement in immigration cases. Scholars have largely embraced the doctrine, although to
varying degrees. One scholar has argued that fugitive disentitlement
was appropriately extended from criminal proceedings to the civil
immigration context and is operating sufficiently as it exists now. 12
Another posits that fugitive disentitlement should only apply to
noncitizens who actively evade capture and custody, as opposed to
noncitizens who merely remain in the United States in defiance of a
removal order. 13 And one scholar advocates that the circuit split
regarding the definition of “fugitive” should be resolved through a
legislative fix that enshrines fugitive disentitlement in the immigration
statute. 14
Other scholars have briefly criticized the doctrine in discussions
of immigration-adjacent topics. Margaret B. Kwoka has pointed out
problems with the application of the doctrine in various circumstances
related to noncitizens’ access to information through Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests. 15 And Michael J. Wishnie critiqued
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in the context of policies intended
to deter noncitizens from reporting crimes to law enforcement,
arguing that such law enforcement policies interfere with the First
Amendment right to petition. 16 Additionally, Geoffrey A. Hoffman
and Susham M. Modi described the fugitive disentitlement doctrine as
part of the war on terror’s attacks on immigration. They raised that
there are potential constitutional problems, and other fairness
11 See infra Parts I and II. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the efficacy
of fugitive disentitlement in criminal and general civil proceedings.
12 See Patrick J. Glen, The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and Immigration Proceedings, 27
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 749, 787 (2013).
13 Lawrence Serkin Winsor, Runaway Usance: Limiting the Exercise of the Fugitive
Disentitlement Doctrine in the Context of Wenqin Sun v. Mukasey and Bright v. Holder, 47 GA.
L. REV. 273, 277 (2012).
14 Kiran H. Griffith, Comment, Fugitives in Immigration: A Call for Legislative Guidelines
on Disentitlement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 209, 234–42 (2012).
15 As discussed infra Section I.B., the Department of Homeland Security had applied
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to FOIA requests. Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA,
127 YALE L.J. 2204, 2248 (2018).
16 See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667,
744–46 (2003).
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concerns, with using fugitive disentitlement outside of the criminal
context. 17 Hoffman and Modi also discussed the infirmity of labeling
people who fail to report to immigration authorities—as opposed to
those who “abscond[]”—as “fugitives,” as well as identifying flaws in
applying the doctrine to asylum seekers in particular. 18
This Article argues that Article III courts have failed to recognize
the essential nature of judicial review in this unique civil context of
immigration law. 19 Courts have not considered the high stakes at issue
in removal proceedings or the lack of available procedural protections
for noncitizens. They have also given short shrift to the question of
whether the courts’ own “inherent powers” truly include the power to
dismiss noncitizens’ cases in this manner. In fact, the rationales
provided in criminal cases do not naturally extend to civil immigration
cases. This Article argues that proper consideration of each of these
arguments should lead courts to eliminate usage of fugitive
disentitlement in immigration matters.
Part I explains how the fugitive disentitlement doctrine,
traditionally applied to people convicted of crimes who had escaped
from jail, was contorted to apply to civil matters, including
immigration. Part I includes an explanation of this doctrinal creep,
including the federal courts’ reasoning for extending the doctrine.
Part II begins by highlighting the practical realities for
noncitizens, most saliently that surrendering to immigration
authorities can result in immediate deportation, even if their court of
appeals case is still pending. This Part also describes the shortcomings
of judicial rationales for applying fugitive disentitlement to
immigration cases. Courts do not have unlimited “inherent power” to
control their dockets. Rather, such powers are limited by principles of
necessity and reasonableness. Dismissal without consideration of the
merits of the case is a disproportionately harsh sanction considering
the high stakes in removal cases, particularly considering that other
sanctions are available to the courts. It is also unreasonable to apply
the doctrine in the removal context because the proffered rationales
do not support it. Moreover, courts’ concerns about upholding their
17 See Geoffrey A. Hoffman & Susham M. Modi, The War on Terror as a Metaphor for
Immigration Regulation: A Critical View of a Distorted Debate, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 449,
479–87 (2012).
18 See id. at 482–83 (quoting Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2007)).
19 The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the “civil” nature of deportation
and removal proceedings. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this
country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this
country is itself a crime.” (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325 (1976))); Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (affirming civil nature of removal proceedings, but
commenting on how criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation are “enmeshed”).
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own dignity should not lead them to abdicate their responsibility to
decide the issues before them. Part II further questions the balance
between the judiciary and legislature in setting the boundaries of
fugitive disentitlement and identifies potential constitutional
problems with applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in removal
proceedings.
Lastly, Part III sets forth several policy reasons why fugitive
disentitlement should not be applied in immigration cases. First, it
explains that judicial review of these cases must be preserved. The
federal courts of appeals have a crucial role in reviewing agency
decisions because decisional independence is lacking in the agencies.
Moreover, the courts have a unique role in statutory interpretation and
constitutional issues, serve an oversight function, and ensure
compliance with international human rights obligations. Thus,
judicial review heightens fairness and enhances the legitimacy of
immigration adjudications in the eyes of the general public as well as
litigants. Moreover, eradicating fugitive disentitlement would avoid
potential abuse of power by the agency as well as the courts themselves.
I.

MIGRATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO IMMIGRATION LAW

Fugitive disentitlement is a judicially created doctrine. 20 It is a
discretionary tool that may be applied to “dismiss an appeal or writ in
a criminal matter when the party seeking relief becomes a fugitive.”21
Courts have continued to extend this doctrine’s reach into other
realms, including civil proceedings. 22 The idea underlying the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine is that a person’s flight during the pendency
of their case is “tantamount to waiver or abandonment” of their claims;
therefore, the reasoning goes, the case should be dismissed without
consideration of the merits of the claims. 23
The Supreme Court has expressed some hesitance in extending
the doctrine to civil matters. In Degen v. United States, a civil forfeiture
matter, the Supreme Court recognized, “the sanction of
20 Fugitive disentitlement is at times referred to as a common-law doctrine, in the
sense that it developed through judicial opinions. See, e.g., Collazos v. United States, 368
F.3d 190, 206 (2d Cir. 2004) (Katzmann, J., concurring); Fatma E. Marouf, Invoking Federal
Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 156 (2019). To avoid
confusion with “common law” in the sense of law carried over from England, the doctrine
will be referred to as “judicially created” or similar descriptors throughout this Article.
21 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (first citing Ortega-Rodriguez v.
United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993); and then citing Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97,
97 (1876)).
22 See, e.g., Bar-Levy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS, 990 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1993).
23 Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez,
507 U.S. at 240); see also Giri, 507 F.3d at 835.
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disentitlement is most severe and so could disserve the dignitary
purposes for which it is invoked.” 24 Regardless of the Court’s admonition, the doctrine has continued its migration into various types of civil
matters. This Part sets forth the various contexts in which the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine has been employed and limited by federal
courts, beginning with the Supreme Court. It also tracks the expansion
of the doctrine into immigration law, a process this Article refers to as
“creep.” 25
A. Fugitive Disentitlement as a Criminal Doctrine
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the fugitive disentitlement doctrine extends back to an 1876 case called Smith v. United
States. 26 In a two-paragraph opinion, the Supreme Court declared its
discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case where the defendant has
absconded and therefore may not “be made to respond to any
judgment we may render.” 27 The Court therefore ordered that the
person turn himself in prior to the first day of the following term, or
his case would be left off of the docket. 28 Thus, the Supreme Court
demonstrated its concern over the enforceability of its decisions,
indicating that a case may be “moot” if the defendant never plans to
turn himself in. 29
Since Smith, the Supreme Court has announced other rationales
justifying the use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to eliminate
cases from court dockets. In 1897, the Supreme Court decided Allen
v. Georgia, which upheld the Georgia Supreme Court’s dismissal of an
appeal of a plaintiff who had escaped from jail after he was sentenced

24 Degen, 517 U.S. at 828.
25 “Creep” is a useful concept for describing how doctrines developed in one context
can later be incorporated into other contexts without adequate justification. See, e.g., Tal
Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1280 (2019) (describing how
doctrine created in a specialized area of contract law became generalized to law outside of
the specialized context). As one other example of an article discussing this concept
regarding immigration law, see Jayesh Rathod, Crimmigration Creep: Reframing Executive
Action on Immigration, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 173, 174 (2015) (critiquing DACA and DAPA’s
inclusion of a new “significant misdemeanor” bar, which expands immigration
consequences for criminal convictions and creates inconsistencies across immigration law).
26 Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (“If we affirm the judgment, he is not
likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will
appear or not, as he may consider most for his interest. Under such circumstances, we are
not inclined to hear and decide what may prove to be only a moot case.”).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 97–98.
29 Id. at 97.

2022]

FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE IN IMMIGRATION

971

to death. 30 The Court echoed the enforceability concerns raised in
Smith, but muddied the waters by articulating additional reasons for
dismissing a case: escape meant there was no longer an actual case or
controversy, the plaintiff should be punished for affronting the dignity
of the court, and the plaintiff had abandoned the appeal. 31 The Court
also noted that, by escaping criminal custody, a person has likely
committed a new criminal offense. 32 Thus, the Court reasoned,
dismissal of the case constituted “a light punishment” compared to
commencing a new criminal prosecution against the escapee; moreover, the escapee seeking to pursue claims after escaping from jail (and
continuing to evade authorities) offended the dignity of the court. 33
The idea of the court’s dignity continued as a theme in later cases. 34
About seventy years passed before the Supreme Court next spoke
on fugitive disentitlement. In Molinaro v. New Jersey, a 1970 case, the
Court authorized immediate dismissal of an appeal, 35 departing from
the earlier practice of giving appellants a set period of time to appear
before facing dismissal of their case. 36 This constituted an acceptance
of fugitive disentitlement serving as a punishment—as there was no
way to undo the past wrong of escaping restraint—rather than
addressing practical concerns about whether a court’s orders would be
enforceable. The Court also clarified that fugitive status does not
affect the “case or controversy” requirement, but rather that an
appellant’s failure to surrender to state authorities while out on bail
“disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for
determination of his claims.” 37
Another shift in fugitive disentitlement in criminal cases came in
1975 with Estelle v. Dorrough. 38 The Estelle Court considered the
constitutionality of a fugitive disentitlement statute enacted by a state
legislature, which permitted automatic dismissal of cases where
prisoners had escaped during the appellate process unless they

30 See Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 139 (1897). The Georgia Supreme Court had
given the appellant “sixty days, or until the last day of the term,” to turn himself in before
dismissing the case. Id. at 142.
31 See id. at 140–41.
32 Id. at 141.
33 See id.
34 See, e.g., Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam).
35 Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam) (“The dismissal
need not await the end of the Term or the expiration of a fixed period of time, but should
take place at this time.”).
36 See, e.g., Allen, 166 U.S. at 142 (stating that state court had authority to determine
the appropriate period of time to give appellant to appear).
37 Molinaro, 396 at 366.
38 See Estelle, 420 U.S. at 543 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

972

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

voluntarily surrendered within ten days of escape. 39 The novel issue in
Estelle was that the appellant had been recaptured after two days and
was back in custody at the time of the dismissal. 40 The Court held that
the state court statute withstood equal protection challenges because
deterrence, punishing escape, and protecting the efficiency and
dignity of appellate courts were sufficiently rational reasons to
disentitle an appellant, even when they were back in custody. 41
In 1993, Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States introduced a limitation
on disentitlement. The criminal defendant had fled during his district
court proceedings, but remained in custody during his appellate
process. 42 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case
without reaching the merits, due to his fugitivity during the district
court proceedings. 43 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
dismissal of the appeal was not warranted because the defendant—who
had been in custody throughout the appellate process—would have
been more appropriately sanctioned by the district court whose
process actually was thwarted by the escape. 44 Thus, there must be a
nexus between the appellate process and the appellant’s fugitive status
in order for disentitlement to be appropriate. 45
To summarize the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the criminal
context, the Court has authorized itself, the federal courts of appeals,
as well as state courts, to set their own rules—with some limitations—
in dismissing appeals of people who are considered fugitives. The
acceptable rationales include concern over enforceability of orders
where a person has escaped physical custody, deterring escape and
encouraging surrender, punishing escape, and preserving efficiency
and dignity of the appellate process. However, there must be a nexus
between fugitivity and the appellate process in order for the dismissal
to be appropriate.
B. Doctrinal Creep to Civil Contexts
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine has since been extended to
both state and federal civil cases, including actions under the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 46 tax courts’ rulings on
39 Id. at 535 (majority opinion).
40 See id. at 534–35.
41 See id. at 537, 541.
42 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 237–39 (1993).
43 Id. at 239.
44 See id. at 251.
45 See id. (“In short, when a defendant’s flight and recapture occur before appeal, the
defendant’s former fugitive status may well lack the kind of connection to the appellate
process that would justify an appellate sanction of dismissal.”).
46 Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2001).
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tax deficiencies and penalties, 47 family court proceedings, 48 and a
variety of other federal civil actions. 49 Courts have gone so far as to say
that “the rule should apply with greater force in civil cases where an
individual’s liberty is not at stake.” 50
Two areas are particularly informative in considering how the
doctrine should be conceptualized in the immigration context: civil
forfeiture and immigration-related Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests. Civil forfeiture has been a particularly important
extension because the Supreme Court made clear declarations about
the propriety of the doctrine in these civil matters and then declined
to apply it, which spurred congressional action. Immigration-related
FOIA requests involve administrative agency action, and fugitive
disentitlement in that context has become largely obsolete.
1. Civil Forfeiture
Degen v. United States was the first case in which the Supreme Court
considered the expansion of fugitive disentitlement into civil forfeiture
proceedings. 51 Specifically, the Court examined whether the doctrine
was properly applied in those civil proceedings when the claimant was
avoiding criminal prosecution. 52 Under the specific circumstances
present in that case, the Court declined to permit a district court to
apply the doctrine in a civil forfeiture action. 53 Yet, what the Degen
Court did not do was state outright that fugitive disentitlement would
never be appropriate in civil forfeiture cases. Nor did the Court
address Degen’s challenge to the constitutionality of the doctrine. 54
47 Conforte v. Comm’r, 692 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1982).
48 D.T. v. P.B., 106 N.Y.S.3d 733, 738 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2019) (dismissing motion to vacate
sequestration order based on fugitive disentitlement).
49 See Mitchell Waldman, Annotation, Application of “Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine” in
Federal Civil Actions, 176 A.L.R. Fed. 333 (2002) (commenting on doctrine’s application in,
inter alia, civil rights, civil forfeiture, copyright infringement, parental rights, tax liability,
bankruptcy, and other types of cases). Civil forfeiture is a legal action intended, “at least in
part, to punish the owner of property used for criminal purposes.” Leonard v. Texas, 137
S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (Mem.) (Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (citing
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618–19 (1993)). Justice Clarence Thomas has noted
that “[t]his system—where police can seize property with limited judicial oversight and
retain it for their own use—has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses.” Id. at 848.
50 Conforte v. Comm’r, 692 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Martha B. Stolley,
Note, Supreme Court Review—Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive Disentitlement
Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 755–56 (1997).
51 See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
52 Id. at 823.
53 See id. at 829.
54 Id. at 828 (“We need not, and do not, intimate a view on whether enforcement of
a disentitlement rule under proper authority would violate due process . . . .”) (citing
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)).
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The facts of Degen are important in understanding the Supreme
Court’s ruling. Degen was indicted by a federal grand jury for running
a massive drug trafficking operation and laundering money, among
other crimes. 55 Before the indictment was unsealed, Degen moved to
Switzerland, and he could not be extradited to face criminal prosecution. 56 The government brought a civil forfeiture action to attempt to
seize Degen’s property that was allegedly related to his drug sales.57
Degen sought to challenge the civil forfeiture action from abroad. 58
However, the government filed a motion for summary judgment based
on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 59 The district court granted
the motion, finding that Degen was a fugitive because he remained
outside of the reach of criminal prosecution. 60 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal. 61
Yet the Supreme Court went on to signal a shift in how the Court
perceived the efficacy of the doctrine. While recognizing the general
power of courts to manage their proceedings, the Supreme Court
cautioned against overzealous use of the doctrine, in part to avoid
overreach of courts’ power. 62 The Court reasoned that Degen’s
fugitive status would not hinder enforcement of the judgment because
the property at issue was already under the court’s control. 63
Moreover, the majority noted that there were other ways for the district
court to manage its proceedings (imposing protective orders and other
limits to discovery, and possibly normal dismissal of the case if he fails
to comply with the district court’s orders during the civil proceedings),
which would prevent Degen from “exploiting the asymmetries he
creates by participating in one suit but not the other.” 64 The high
Court cautioned that outright dismissal of a case is “too blunt an
instrument for advancing” either the interests of preserving the dignity
of the court or deterrence. 65 The Court went on to say that
disentitlement is a sanction “most severe and so could disserve the
dignitary purposes for which it is invoked,” warning that freely
dismissing cases may actually erode the court’s dignity. 66

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

See id. at 821.
Id. at 821–22.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 822.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 823.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 826–27.
Id. at 828.
Id.
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In response to Degen, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA). 67 CAFRA codified the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in the limited context of civil forfeiture actions or thirdparty claims in related criminal forfeiture actions. 68 The statute
contains some specific parameters, yet also makes clear that courts may
choose not to impose the penalty. 69 Judges may disentitle a person’s
claim where the person had “notice or knowledge of the fact that a
warrant or process has been issued for his apprehension” and fled the
jurisdiction “in order to avoid criminal prosecution.” 70
CAFRA demonstrates the legislature’s desire to limit judicial
power to dismiss cases in civil forfeiture matters. CAFRA authorizes
courts to sanction fugitivity in civil forfeiture cases, but courts may only
do so where (1) there was an impending criminal prosecution, (2) that
the individual had sufficient notice of that fact, and (3) they had fled
specifically to avoid the prosecution. This differs starkly from how the
doctrine is applied in immigration cases, as will be explained in Section
I.C.
2. Immigration-Related FOIA
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine also has played a role, to a
decreasing extent, in immigration-related requests under the FOIA. 71
Professor Margaret B. Kwoka has noted that, in 2015, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) applied the doctrine to deny FOIA
requests to allegedly “fugitive” requestors more than 4,000 times.72
Professor Kwoka also remarked that, because FOIA denials are
infrequently challenged in court, “DHS’s interpretation acts as a
practical barrier for a nontrivial number of requesters.” 73
Yet, it appears there has been a significant downward trend in the
use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in immigration-related
FOIA requests during recent years. This trend might be explained, at
least in part, by a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Colorado challenging ICE’s practice of denying FOIA requests
67 Gary P. Naftalis & Alan R. Friedman, Fugitive Disentitlement in Civil Forfeiture
Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 2002.
68 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185 § 14 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2466 (2018)).
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 While this subsection examines immigration-related FOIA requests, fugitive
disentitlement has also been discussed regarding nonimmigration FOIA requests. See EMILY
CREIGHTON, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE: FOIA AND
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW 5–6 (2013) (discussing three nonimmigration FOIA lawsuits).
72 Kwoka, supra note 15, at 2248.
73 Id.
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based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 74 As the court noted in
Smith v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE promulgated its
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) related to fugitive
disentitlement in July 2017, on the date that ICE’s discovery responses
were due to the plaintiff’s counsel. 75 The SOP provided that a
“fugitive” was someone who failed to depart the country, report to ICE,
comply with any conditions placed on them, or who is wanted for
certain criminal violations. 76 On those grounds, ICE declared that a
person’s records would be categorically withheld if the records were
held in a particular place, rather than withholding them based on the
type of record. 77 In December 2019, the federal district court ruled
that the blanket withholding enabled by the SOP—basing categorical
withholdings on where the files were located—was an improper basis
to exempt ICE from releasing documents. 78 The court then enjoined
ICE from “withholding its records pursuant to the SOP or any other
policy or practice not materially different from the SOP.” 79 The Smith
court did not reach the broader issue of whether fugitive disentitlement could be applied in FOIA cases. 80
In 2018, DHS reported that it only used the doctrine eight times
in FOIA cases, and in 2019, DHS reported it was not invoked at all. 81
While there may have been other forces at play, 82 it is possible that the
Smith litigation had some impact on the agency’s invocation of fugitive
disentitlement in FOIA requests. 83
74 Smith v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 429 F. Supp. 3d 742, 745 (D. Colo. 2019).
75 Id. at 758.
76 Id. at 751.
77 Id. at 764. However, the court did not explicitly address the application of the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine with respect to the SOP because it noted that ICE did not
rely on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in its briefing. Rather, the court only needed
to address ICE’s argument that the documents were properly withheld pursuant to a FOIA
exemption. Id. at 763–64.
78 Id. at 766–67.
79 Id. at 768.
80 For an analysis on whether fugitive disentitlement is properly applied in FOIA cases,
see Bernard Bell, “The Fugitive:” ICE, Fugitives, and FOIA (Part II), YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE
& COMMENT (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-fugitive-ice-fugitives-andfoia-part-ii [https://perma.cc/9BYV-WRTT].
81 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2018 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES 7 (2019); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2019
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES 16 (2020).
82 The author has submitted a FOIA request to ICE seeking information related to
the use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to deny requests.
83 For other perspectives on why fugitive disentitlement is not appropriate in FOIA
requests to the immigration agencies, see CREIGHTON, supra note 71, at 3–5 (suggesting
advocates raise arguments that “any person” may request information under FOIA, that
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C. Extension to Immigration Appeals
Since at least the 1980s, the federal courts of appeals have
employed the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to dismiss immigrationrelated matters. 84 Those appellate cases have included habeas corpus
denials, 85 Board of Immigration Appeals denials of motions to reopen
and reconsider, 86 and petitions for review of removal orders. 87 Some
cases pertain to fugitive disentitlement during the circuit court
process, and others consider the BIA’s dismissal of a matter on those
grounds. Contrary to what some courts have stated, fugitive disentitlement does not raise jurisdictional issues but rather is purely
discretionary. 88
It is not immediately apparent why or how the concept of
“fugitivity”—which so obviously evokes images of criminal
proceedings—was shoehorned into civil immigration proceedings.
Noncitizens who are in civil immigration proceedings do not readily
appear to be similarly situated to people convicted of crimes who are
on the lam (in some circumstances, after physically escaping from jail).
A description of immigration administrative and appellate processes,
followed by an exploration of the courts’ reasoning for extending the
doctrine into this context, is therefore warranted.
1. Immigration Administrative and Appellate Processes
Noncitizens first encounter immigration enforcement through a
variety of mechanisms. First, noncitizens might be stopped at ports of
equitable principles do not apply, and that the agency responding to FOIA requests is not
the court that would rule on the litigation).
84 See e.g., Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 76 (3d Cir. 1982) (dismissal of appeal challenging
district court’s denial of petition for habeas corpus because noncitizen “has hidden his
whereabouts from immigration authorities and this Court and has failed to comply with an
order and a bench warrant issued by the district court”).
85 See generally id.
86 Bright v. Holder, 649 F.3d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2011).
87 Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Removal orders are
those that determine whether a person is removable or ordering removal. Nasrallah v. Barr,
140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) (2018), the definition of
“order of deportation”).
88 See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam) (dismissing
appeal). For example, in Bright, the Fifth Circuit seemed to interpret the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine as a question of justiciability, as it concluded the court was “barred
from further review.” Bright, 649 F.3d at 400. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation is likely to
be found erroneous, as Molinaro makes clear that fugitive disentitlement is a discretionary
doctrine and does not constitute a bar to hearing a case. See Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366. This
issue was raised in Bright’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which the
Court declined to hear. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bright, 649 F.3d 397 (No. 11890); Bright, 649 F.3d 397, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1021 (2012).
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entry, in the instance of lawful permanent residents returning from
abroad or people presenting themselves at the border to seek asylum. 89
Second, noncitizens might apply affirmatively for immigration benefits
with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and be
denied, which results in referral to immigration court for removal
proceedings. 90
Third, noncitizens may encounter immigration
enforcement officials in the interior of the country, due to activities
such as raids or surveillance, for example, or through interactions with
the criminal legal system. 91
Once the Department of Homeland Security receives information
regarding a noncitizen, it will determine what enforcement action to
take: (1) issue an “expedited” removal order, (2) enforce a prior
removal order, or (3) initiate removal proceedings. 92 Expedited
removal applies to noncitizens who arrive at the border or ports of
entry, as well as those who are apprehended within 100 miles of the
U.S. borders within two weeks of arriving in the country. 93 In 2019,
former President Trump issued an executive order directing DHS to
expand expedited removal, extending it to people who are
undocumented, have committed fraud or misrepresentation, and
cannot prove their presence in the United States for at least two years
prior to apprehension. 94 In those cases, immigration officers may
order the noncitizen removed without a hearing and without opportunity for review, unless the person expresses an intent to seek asylum

89 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2018) (stating that noncitizens physically present in the
U.S. or who arrive in the U.S., whether or not at a designated port of arrival, may apply for
asylum).
90 For more information on USCIS’s current policy regarding the issuance of NTAs,
see Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Troy
Miller, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of the Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Tae
Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t & Tracey Renaud, Senior Off.
Performing the Duties of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Jan. 20, 2021) (titled
“Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies
and Priorities”).
91 Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1573–79 (2010) (discussing trends
in interior immigration enforcement).
92 For DHS’s description of these processes, see MIKE GUO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., OFF. IMMIGR. STAT., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2019, at 3 (2020).
93 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, 48879-80 (Aug. 11,
2004).
94 See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35409, 35410 (July 23,
2019); HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45314, EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS:
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2, 41 (2019); Vanessa Romo, Trump Administration Moves to Speed Up
Deportations with Expedited Removal Expansion, NPR (July 22, 2019), https://www.npr.org
/2019/07/22/744177726/trump-administration-moves-to-speed-up-deportations-withexpedited-removal-expan [https://perma.cc/3JZ2-J2LA].

2022]

FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE IN IMMIGRATION

979

or fear of persecution. 95 If they express fear, the noncitizen is entitled
to an interview with an asylum officer (a “credible fear interview”) and
then will have their asylum application considered further. 96
Where an individual has a prior removal order, the order can be
reinstated and the noncitizen will be deported immediately, unless the
individual expresses fear of persecution or torture in their country of
origin. 97 If they do state such a fear, they will have an opportunity to
present their case to an asylum officer (a “reasonable fear interview”)
and then through the immigration court process. 98
To initiate immigration court proceedings, DHS files a Notice to
Appear (NTA) with the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR). 99 EOIR will then set the noncitizen for a master calendar
hearing. The time noncitizens wait for a first hearing may vary widely.
If the noncitizen is detained by DHS because DHS has decided not to
release them, there may also be a bond redetermination hearing set by
the immigration court at any time at the noncitizen’s request. 100
DHS may seek to remove noncitizens who it alleges are either
inadmissible or deportable. 101 Inadmissibility includes noncitizens
who are present in the U.S. without being properly admitted. 102
Deportability means that the government is alleging the noncitizen has
violated conditions of their status or has committed crimes that subject
them to removal. 103 The government initially bears the burden of
proving that the individual is an “alien,” meaning that they were born
in another country and have no claim to U.S. citizenship. 104
Additionally, if the noncitizen has lawful status, then DHS will bear the
burden of proving that they are deportable. 105 If DHS does not meet
its burden of proving alienage or deportability, the proceedings will be
terminated.

95 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
96 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B) (2018); U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/questions-andanswers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/5F5N-FTXS] (last updated July 15,
2015).
97 See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(a), (e) (2020).
98 AM. IMMIG. COUNCIL & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT,
REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL 3 (2019); see 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(a), (e) (2020); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.31(e).
99 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14–1003.15 (2020). In 2019, DHS issued 790,000 NTAs.
Memorandum from David Pekoske, supra note 90, at 7.
100 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.
101 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a).
102 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A).
103 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
104 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2020).
105 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2020).
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Even if DHS meets its burden of proving a person is present
without admission or parole, or that they are deportable, the noncitizen will still have the opportunity to apply for relief from removal to
try to remain in the U.S. Such remedies could include: asylum,
withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against
Torture, various forms of cancellation of removal, or adjustment of
status. 106 Noncitizens bear the burden of proving eligibility for relief
from removal. 107 In addition to applying for relief from removal,
noncitizens may also wish to challenge any statutory, regulatory, or
constitutional violations that led to their being placed in removal
proceedings. Such challenges may be brought via a motion to suppress
evidence, or a motion to terminate removal proceedings, or both.
In terms of adjudicatory procedures, the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not strictly apply in
removal proceedings, although they are often used as guidance. 108
Rather, immigration courts and the BIA are bound by the Immigration
and Nationality Act, agency regulations, legal precedent set by the
Board of Immigration Appeals, as well as precedent from the circuit
court in which the case arose and the Supreme Court.
The losing party in immigration court may appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. 109 Bond decisions and the immigration judges’
final rulings are appealable. Other issues may also be appealed, but
the rules around interlocutory decisionmaking are unclear. Once the
BIA renders a decision, the administrative removal order is considered
to be final. The losing party at the BIA may then petition for review to
the federal circuit where the immigration court that initially decided
the case sits. 110 The last opportunity to appeal is then to the Supreme
Court of the United States.

106 U.S. DEP’T JUST., FACT SHEET: FORMS OF RELIEF FROM REMOVAL (Aug. 3, 2004).
Noncitizens may also qualify for other relief adjudicated by USCIS, such as U visas or T visas.
However, because that relief is granted by USCIS and not by the immigration courts, it is
not discussed here.
107 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2020).
108 Matter of Findley, 2017 WL 1130670, at *3 (BIA Jan. 31, 2017) (noting that “the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings, and hearsay is
admissible”). But see Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 458–59 (BIA 2011) (analyzing the
sufficiency of authentication of documents using Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a)–(b)(1),
even though not strictly binding). Editor’s note: in this Article, citations to immigration
cases reflect industry and court conventions that are slightly different from the Bluebook’s
guidance.
109 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2020).
110 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018) (providing that constitutional claims and
questions of law may be raised on a petition for review filed with a federal court of appeals).
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Petitions for review by the courts of appeals are the only vehicle
to obtain judicial review of a removal order. 111 Congress has limited
judicial review in certain aspects of immigration cases. In 1996,
Congress passed jurisdiction-stripping measures through the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 112
AEDPA barred judicial review of cases where noncitizens had been
convicted of certain crimes and curtailed habeas corpus review of
removal orders. 113 Noncitizens applying for admission at the border
can be denied entry through the mechanism of expedited removal
“without further hearing or review,” unless the noncitizen states that
they are seeking asylum. 114 Judicial review is also limited for people
who have committed certain crimes and those who have applied for
discretionary relief from removal. 115
Also in 1996, Congress modified the law surrounding judicial
review of immigration matters through the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 116
The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that courts do not
have “jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision . . . to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under
this chapter.” 117 The jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals is
limited to reviewing “constitutional claims or questions of law.”118
Some of the provisions around what issues are reviewable are quite
complex. For example, even though a respondent in immigration
court can apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), a CAT order is not the same as a “removal order” because relief
111 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2018).
112 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
113 David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2487 (1998). The Supreme Court
threw the issue of whether removal orders could be challenged via habeas corpus actions
in the district courts into question. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 303–14 (2001). The
REAL ID Act of 2005 struck back, clarifying that final orders of removal can only be reviewed
by the circuit courts, and cannot be reviewed through habeas petitions to the district courts.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-113, div. B, 119 Stat. 302, 313.
114 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
115 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2018). For further discussion of these statutes and
the extent to which the immigration agencies may exercise discretionary authority, see
Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 99–
100 (2017).
116 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, §§ 303, 306, 372, 374, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
1103, 1226, 1229a–29c, 1252 (2018)).
117 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2018).
118 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018).
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under CAT—meaning, the noncitizen is permitted to stay in the
United States—can be granted even if a removal order remains in
place. 119 Nonetheless, CAT orders are reviewed in petitions for review
along with any challenge regarding a removal order. 120 This led to a
circuit split regarding the judicial review of CAT claims, especially
where the INA bars judicial review for noncitizens who have been
convicted of certain crimes. In 2020, the Supreme Court resolved the
circuit split in favor of judicial review.121
2. Overview of Courts’ Rationales
Despite the complex interplay of administrative and judicial
processes in immigration matters, including the fact that there is
limited judicial review, federal courts have largely embraced the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Arana v. INS was an early case where
fugitive disentitlement was applied to an immigration-related appeal.
In this 1982 case, the Third Circuit found that the appellant “has
hidden his whereabouts from immigration authorities and this Court
and has failed to comply with an order and a bench warrant issued by
the district court.” 122 The court focused on enforceability concerns
and also stated that hiding from immigration authorities disentitled
the appellant from calling on the court’s resources. 123
Yet, the Arana court gave a cursory explanation for why fugitive
disentitlement should apply in the immigration context at all:
[N]othing in the Supreme Court’s opinion [in Molinaro] suggests
that the rule announced there is applicable only in the criminal-law
context. If anything—given the plethora of constitutional and
statutory procedural protections that are afforded to criminal
defendants but not made available to individuals subjected to
administrative deportation proceedings . . .—a court might
exercise greater caution in dismissing the appeal of a convicted
party who has escaped than of a potential deportee who has
absconded. 124

Said another way, the fact that criminal defendants are entitled to
greater statutory and constitutional protections than people in

119 A CAT grant simply means that the United States will not remove someone to the
specific country where they fear torture. The noncitizen may be removed to another
country where they have citizenship or may stay detained until a country will accept them
(with some limits). 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(b)(2).
120 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2018).
121 Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2020) (holding jurisdiction-stripping 8
U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) inapplicable to CAT challenges).
122 Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 76 (3d Cir. 1982).
123 Id. at 77.
124 Id. at 77 n.2.
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deportation proceedings indicates that criminal defendants are more
entitled to appeals than immigration respondents. Thus, the Third
Circuit reasoned, courts should be even less cautious in dismissing
immigration-related matters than criminal-related matters.
This same rationale was quoted a decade later by the often-cited
Second Circuit case Bar-Levy v. U.S. Department of Justice. 125 There, the
court dismissed a noncitizen’s appeal on fugitivity grounds because he
did not surrender to the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) after the court denied his request for a stay of deportation. 126
The Bar-Levy court stated that a noncitizen who fails to surrender to
immigration authorities for deportation is a “fugitive from justice,”
even though they are not a fugitive in a criminal matter. 127 However,
even in Bar-Levy, the court did not rely on any authority on point for
such a broad statement, merely citing two cases: one where the person
had physically escaped from federal custody, and Arana, in which the
person refused to surrender where a bench warrant had been issued
by a district court. 128 Nor did the Bar-Levy court mention whether the
petitioner had changed addresses or otherwise was hiding from the
law; the only fact the court considered was that he failed to turn himself
in to the INS.
Despite these unsatisfactory justifications for doctrinal creep, the
federal courts of appeals have continued to invoke fugitive
disentitlement in immigration matters based on several rationales.
Bar-Levy highlighted four justifications for fugitive disentitlement:
enforceability, sanction for flouting the judicial process, promoting
efficiency, and avoiding prejudice to the government. 129 These factors
continued to serve as the basis for the Second Circuit’s future
applications of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 130 Notably, in Gao
v. Gonzales, the court chastised Mr. Gao for showing “disdain[]” for the
authority of the court, explaining that he had continued living in the
United States and failed to comply with the immigration agency’s
order to surrender for ten years. 131
125 Bar-Levy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS, 990 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Arana,
673 F.2d at 77 n.2).
126 Id. at 34.
127 Id. (first citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam); and
then quoting United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1991)).
128 Id. at 35 (citing Hussein v. INS, 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1986); Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d
75, 77 (3d Cir. 1982)). It is unclear whether the district court in Arana properly entered a
bench warrant in a case reviewing a deportation order.
129 Id. (citing United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1988)).
130 See, e.g., Qian Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2007); Yi Ying Chen v.
Mukasey, 275 F. App’x 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2008); Nen Di Wu v. Holder, 617 F.3d 97, 100 (2d
Cir. 2010).
131 Gao, 481 F.3d at 174, 177.
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But even within circuits, at times, the lines around fugitivity are
not clearly drawn. A few years after issuing its decision in Gao, the
Second Circuit issued Wu v. Holder, in which it declined to apply
fugitive disentitlement where the petitioner disobeyed two DHS
commands to report for removal. 132 The Wu court distinguished Gao
in several ways. First, it stated that DHS knew where to locate Mr.
Wu. 133 Second, the court distinguished the amount of time that had
passed since the dates the petitioners were ordered to surrender; Mr.
Wu had been a fugitive for fourteen months, while Mr. Gao had let
seven years lapse. 134 The Wu court also stated it was not clear that Mr.
Wu had the same level of “disdain[]” for court authority, because the
two stays of removal issued by the court itself had likely made DHS’
orders to report for deportation confusing. 135 Another interesting
point raised by the court was that invoking the doctrine in Mr. Wu’s
case “would conflate disobedience of an executive command with that
of a court order.” 136 This statement was a sharp contrast to Gao, where
the court had in part dismissed the case because of Mr. Gao’s refusal
to follow the immigration agency’s orders to surrender. 137
Moreover, the Wu court raised concerns for the first time that
“broad reliance on the doctrine by the government would probably
require a significantly greater use of our time and resources than
occurs when we consider such cases on the merits.” 138 In essence, the
court noted that waiting for briefing and then ruling on motions to
dismiss regarding fugitivity, particularly because the court has
discretion whether to apply the doctrine, would increase the time
spent per case. Lastly, the Wu court changed the analysis of prejudice
to the government. Rather than asking if DHS would have to expend
resources in the future to apprehend Mr. Wu in the event he lost his
case, as it had done in Gao, the court noted that “the government has
presented no evidence” that fugitivity had already prejudiced the
case. 139
Thus, in Wu, the Second Circuit seemed to go out of its way to
distinguish from Gao and narrow the scope of fugitive disentitlement.
For the first time in the Second Circuit, Wu implied that DHS’
knowledge of the petitioner’s whereabouts was a factor that weighed
against dismissal, considered the short duration of fugitivity, and took
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Nen Di Wu v. Holder, 646 F.3d 133, 133–35 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Gao, 481 F.3d at 177.
Wu, 646 at 137.
Id.
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into account that the government had not yet experienced prejudice
due to fugitive status. 140 It also raised new concerns about the resources the court would expend in ruling on motions to dismiss
pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, as well as questioned
whether the court was conflating disobedience of executive branch
orders with court orders.
These circuits’ cases demonstrate the wide range of factors that
courts might take into account, and the accompanying lack of clarity,
when they consider whether to invoke the doctrine in immigration
cases.
3. Two Circuit Splits Regarding Definitions of Fugitivity
One of the key issues in fugitive disentitlement cases is the
definition of fugitivity. In general, courts of appeals have found fugitive status where a noncitizen “fails to comply with a notice to
surrender for deportation.” 141 However, just like the courts draw
different lines around what factors they consider as a whole, they also
have different definitions of “fugitive.” A look at the cases reveals that
the distinctions revolve less around the facts of each case and depend
more on the courts’ attitudes regarding respect for authority, as well
as concerns regarding prejudice to the government.
The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on whether fugitive
disentitlement is appropriately applied in immigration law. One
petitioner sought Supreme Court review in Bright v. Holder, a case
arising out of the Fifth Circuit. The petitioner asked the high court to
weigh in on two aspects—each constituting a circuit split—of the
definition of “fugitive”: (1) whether noncitizens who fail to follow
agency orders are “fugitives” under the doctrine when their
whereabouts are known, and (2) whether a noncitizen is a “fugitive”
for purposes of the doctrine when they are currently in custody.142
However, the Supreme Court declined to take up the case, 143 so these
issues remain unresolved.
The most heavily contested legal issue on which circuits are split
is whether a person constitutes a “fugitive” when they have not
presented to DHS for removal, but their whereabouts are known to
DHS, counsel, and the court. 144
140 Id. at 136–37.
141 Gao, 481 F.3d at 176 (citing Bar-Levy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS, 990 F.2d 33, 35 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
142 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 95, at i, 11–12. The Petition also asked
the court to conclude that the Fifth Circuit was incorrect in its categorization of the doctrine
as a per se jurisdictional bar to appellate review. Id.
143 Bright v. Holder, 566 U.S. 1021 (2012) (denying certiorari).
144 See Winsor, supra note 13, at 283–86 (describing nature of circuit split).
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The Fifth Circuit is on one side of the circuit split, along with the
Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, who all liberally apply the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. 145 In Bright, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
petitioner “has maintained the same address throughout his removal
proceedings, the address was known to DHS, and DHS made no
attempt to locate or arrest the alien following his failure to report for
removal.”146 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for
review, citing the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 147 The court
emphasized the function of fugitive disentitlement as “encourag[ing]
voluntary surrenders, the efficient operation of the courts, and respect
for the judiciary and the rule of law.” 148 Moreover, the court referenced the Second Circuit’s decision in Gao, saying: “Everyone
understands that the government is overwhelmed with petitioners and
procedures, and that it heavily relies on the word and voluntary
compliance of numerous aliens within our borders. It is easy to game
this system, but we should not treat disregard of government directives
as a norm.”149 Thus, on this side of the split, enforceability of court
orders is not the most salient rationale for invoking the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. Rather, the justifications highlight deterrence, punishment, and the need to respect the authority of the
government and judiciary. Using language designed to arouse feelings
of righteousness, like “gaming the system,” also exposes attitudes
normally buried under more neutral judicial prose.
Another interesting aspect of these courts’ perspective is how they
discuss the question of prejudice, or inconvenience, to the
government. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have strongly
145 See, e.g., Qian Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d at 176; Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833, 835
(5th Cir. 2007); Garcia-Flores v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 2007); Sapoundjiev
v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2004).
146 Bright v. Holder, 649 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1021
(2012). The facts in Mr. Bright’s case as presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari
are particularly compelling. He had been a lawful permanent resident since 1985, had a
U.S. citizen son who is a U.S. Marine, owned a home, and lived his life until 2007 when he
misplaced his green card and applied for a replacement. At the immigration office, he was
told that he would be deported based on a conviction from two decades prior, for which he
had never spent a day in prison, and he was never found guilty because the adjudication
was deferred. Moreover, Mr. Bright’s legal argument was undoubtedly meritorious
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 480 (2011).
Yet, Mr. Bright failed to report for deportation, so the BIA dismissed his motion to reopen
on those grounds. Mr. Bright remained at the same address the government had on file.
Yet, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the agency that he was a “fugitive” and dismissed his case.
He was then arrested at his home and detained, so he sought rehearing en banc, which the
Fifth Circuit denied. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 95, at i, 5-6, 9-10, 34.
147 Bright, 649 F.3d at 400.
148 Id. (citing Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2007))
149 Id. (quoting Gao, 481 F.3d at 176).
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expressed such a concern. For example, the Second Circuit found
prejudice to the government where a petitioner had married and had
two children, which he argued warranted reopening his immigration
case. 150 The Second Circuit stated that it would create a perverse
incentive to allow noncitizens to “contrive through their own efforts a
new basis for challenging deportation,” referring to the petitioner’s
marriage and new fatherhood, and dismissed the case. 151 All three of
these circuits have also assumed the responsibility to guard DHS from
prejudice in the sense that the government would have to expend
resources to go to noncitizens’ homes to arrest them, even when the
noncitizens’ whereabouts are known. 152
On the other side of the split, the Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits hold that petitioners are not fugitives when their
whereabouts are known. 153 As opposed to sanctioning bad behavior or
preventing expenditure of government resources, these circuits
appear more concerned with enforceability. For example, in Sun v.
Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit declined to dismiss the case of a noncitizen
who did not surrender herself for removal, but filed change-of-address
forms with DHS and maintained contact with her counsel as well as the
court during the appellate process. 154 In the court’s discussion of
justifications for fugitive disentitlement, it appears most concerned
with the practical concern of enforceability, since the court simply said
that the petitioner’s whereabouts were known and she was therefore
not a fugitive. 155
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Martin v. Mukasey found that the
noncitizen petitioner was a fugitive because DHS had made attempts
to contact him, but he could not be located. 156 The noncitizen “not
only failed to appear for his scheduled appointment, he also failed to
provide DHS with his current address.” 157 It then expressed concern
about the enforceability of any decision it would render, due to the
physical absence of the petitioner: “Because Mr. Martin is nowhere to
be found, the decision to deport him would mean nothing unless and

150 Gao, 481 F.3d at 177–78.
151 Id. at 178.
152 See Bright, 649 F.3d at 400 (citing Gao, 481 F.3d at 176; Sapoundjiev v. Ashcroft, 376
F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2004)).
153 See Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1982); Nnebedum v. Gonzales, 205 F.
App’x 479, 480–81 (8th Cir. 2006); Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.
2003); Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008); Xiang Feng Zhou v. Att’y
Gen., 290 F. App’x 278, 281 (11th Cir. 2008).
154 See Wenqin Sun v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2009).
155 Id. at 804–05.
156 517 F.3d 1201, 1202–04 (10th Cir. 2008).
157 Id. at 1203.
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until he turned himself in or was found.” 158 The other circuits that
decline to dismiss cases where a person’s whereabouts are known also
typically identify enforceability as a primary concern. 159 These enforceability concerns relate back to the issue of mootness, which was the
rationale the Supreme Court initially proffered when it created fugitive
disentitlement. 160
The second circuit split raised in the Bright petition to the
Supreme Court was whether the fugitive disentitlement doctrine
should apply when the petitioner, who earlier absconded, is now in the
government’s physical custody. 161 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits—on the
harsher side of this issue—have held that a past failure to obey a
government order is evidence of future intent to evade future court
orders; in their view, wholesale dismissal of the case is therefore
justified, even for people who are in custody or whose whereabouts are
known to DHS. 162
This discussion warrants returning to the case discussed above in
the Introduction. Similar to Mr. Bright’s situation where the government continued asserting that he was a fugitive even after he was
detained by immigration authorities, 163 the government argued in Mr.
A’s case that he was a “fugitive” even though he was physically in ICE
custody. 164 This is incongruous with ICE’s own statements in the FOIA
context, where ICE defined fugitive as “any subject, not in ICE
custody.” 165 And particularly as opposed to people who have fled and
cannot be physically located, detained noncitizens’ refusal to act are
not “tantamount to waiver or abandonment” of their claims. 166 There
also should be no concern over the enforceability of decisions against
noncitizens who are physically in custody.
158 Id. at 1204–05 (“Without the fugitive present to accept the decision of this court,
there is no guarantee that our judgment could be executed.”).
159 Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1982) (highlighting that petitioner may not
make himself available to immigration appeals if he lost); See Nnebedum v. Gonzales, 205
F. App’x 479, 480–81 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing absence of evidence that petitioner
could not be located); Martin, 517 F.3d at 1204 (“First and foremost is our concern for the
enforceability of our decisions.”); Xiang Feng Zhou v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 290 F. App’x 278,
281 (11th Cir. 2008) (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply the doctrine even though
petitioner failed to update his address with DHS because he otherwise did not show
unwillingness to submit to court’s authority).
160 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
161 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 95, at 17–19.
162 Garcia-Flores v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 439, 441–42 (6th Cir. 2007); Bright v. Holder,
649 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 2011).
163 See supra note 146.
164 See supra note 9.
165 Smith v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 429 F. Supp. 3d 742, 751 (D. Colo. 2019).
166 Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1204 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez v. United
States, 507 U.S. 234, 240 (1993)).
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Both of the circuit splits discussed here demonstrate that some
courts are more concerned with practical concerns around the
enforceability of their orders, while others care more about respect for
the government and seek to impose a sanction on those who are viewed
as flouting authority.
II.

SHORTCOMINGS OF JUDICIAL RATIONALES

This Part highlights several problems with applying the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine in the immigration context. First, federal
courts have asserted that the source of their ability to dismiss cases
pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is their “inherent
authority” to take actions necessary to carry out their duties. 167 This
inherent authority, courts say, includes “protect[ing] their
proceedings and judgments.” 168
However, there are limits to judicial power to dismiss cases, and
this Article posits that federal courts have exceeded those limits with
respect to fugitive disentitlement in immigration cases. Specifically,
exercise of judicial power that has not been explicitly granted by the
Constitution or Congress must be both necessary and reasonable, and
the rationale the courts rely on for disentitlement do not extend to
immigration as directly as the courts have said. And as a starting place,
courts must understand the realities that noncitizens face when
considering whether to surrender to immigration authorities.
A. Practical Consequences of Surrendering to Immigration Authorities
Some courts have proclaimed that civil litigants should be more
stringently subject to the doctrine than criminal defendants, because
civil litigants’ liberty is not at stake. 169 However, this rationale does not
apply in the immigration context because significant liberty concerns
are implicated for noncitizens in removal proceedings. Noncitizens
face the possibility of detention during removal proceedings, as well as
after a removal order has issued. Moreover, noncitizens can be
deported while their petition for review is pending at the court of
appeals. Deportation itself deprives a noncitizen of their liberty and
“may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes

167 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823–24 (1996).
168 Id. at 823 (first citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46 (1991); then
citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962); and then citing United States
v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).
169 Stolley, supra note 50, at 755–56.
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life worth living.”170 This is only one way that courts have failed to
recognize the practical realities of immigration cases.
Additionally, in applying the doctrine, courts have largely focused
on definitions of “fugitivity” completely isolated from the reasons why
noncitizens may not voluntarily turn themselves in to immigration
authorities in the first place. Moreover, courts typically have not
acknowledged the impact of deportation while a petition for review is
pending.
Examining these circumstances is critical to understanding the
fuller picture of immigration enforcement and courts’ power in this
arena. Some courts have treated failing to surrender as sheer flouting
of authority and disrespect for the government. 171 Yet, there are a
multitude of reasons why noncitizens may not surrender that courts
should at least take into account. As discussed above, differing values
among courts of appeals partially explain the radically different
approaches that they take in applying the doctrine. Thus, examining
the realities of enforcement and outcomes for noncitizens could lead
to—if not outright abolition of the doctrine—more thoughtful
consideration by the courts of whether to apply the doctrine in
individual cases.
1. Immediate Deportation
A critical reality noncitizens face is that they can be deported
immediately once the BIA has dismissed the appeal. 172 Without a
guarantee that they can remain in the United States while waiting for
judicial review, surrendering may not seem like a wise option. Asylum
seekers in particular—fearing persecution, torture, or death in their
countries of origin—want to exhaust every possible option and may be
terrified that they will never be able to see their case through if they
are deported. Yet, the existence of fugitive disentitlement means that
failing to surrender could result in the court dismissing their petition
for review, leaving them with no chance at prevailing on their case.
A key problem for noncitizens is that there is no automatic stay of
removal while their petition for review is pending. 173
While
170 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deporting a person
claiming to be a citizen “obviously deprives him of liberty” (citing Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908))); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (noting a
resident’s liberty was at stake because, “[t]hough deportation is not technically a criminal
proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom”).
171 See supra subsection I.C.3.
172 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2018).
173 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2018) (providing no automatic stay, unless the court
orders otherwise).
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noncitizens are generally entitled to an automatic stay of removal when
appealing an immigration judge’s decision to the BIA, 174 there is no
automatic stay of removal after the BIA issues a final removal order.
Therefore, when noncitizens file petitions for review with the federal
courts of appeals, they must also file a motion to stay removal. 175 Yet
stays of removal are not routinely granted by the courts. According to
one study conducted by Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan, and Rebecca
Gill, stays are granted as rarely as 4–14% of the time across five
circuits. 176 The same study found that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had
the highest rate of granting stays, granting 48% and 63% of the
motions filed, respectively. 177
The difficult standard noncitizens must meet explains, in part, the
low grant rates. In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that the
test for preliminary injunctions was applicable to motions for stays of
removal as well. 178 Thus, pursuant to Nken, the noncitizen must prove:
(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case, (2) they face
irreparable harm if a stay is not granted, (3) the government will not
be unduly prejudiced by a stay, and (4) that the stay of removal is in
the public interest. 179
A serious problem identified by the study on stays of removal was
that the circuit courts in the study were quite inaccurate when trying
to assess “likelihood of success.” 180 For example, 44% of the asylum
applicants who ultimately won their cases had been denied stays of
removal. 181 Thus, due to the low grant rate of the motions in the first
place, plus the fact that courts so often wrongly assess the likelihood of
success, the availability of stays of removal is not an appropriate stopgap in preventing wrongful removals.
174 8 CFR § 1003.6(a) (2020).
175 See generally Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
176 Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant
Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 364 (2014) [hereinafter Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly]
(“Overall, five of the circuits granted fewer than 15% of stay requests: the Fifth (4%), Tenth
(6%), Eleventh (6%), Eighth (10%), and Fourth (14%).”).
177 Id. at 364–65.
178 556 U.S. at 426.
179 Id. at 434. Advocates have called for a revisiting of the standard articulated in Nken.
As pointed out by scholars, the decision in Nken rested in large part on a government
misstatement. Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly, supra note 176, at 340. Specifically, the
government represented that it assists noncitizens in returning to the United States after a
favorable decision. Id. at 348 n.52. Yet, the government had no such policy or practice at
the time. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court relied on that statement in finding that deportation alone was not sufficient to rise to the level of “irreparable harm.” Nken, 556 U.S. at
435, 438. Thus there may be cause for the Court to revisit at least the “irreparable harm”
prong of the Nken test.
180 See Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly, supra note 176, at 385.
181 Id.
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Deportation while a petition for review is pending at a circuit
court may have disastrous effects for any noncitizen, but especially for
those who fear returning to their countries of origin. Returning to our
real-life example of Mr. A, he desperately wanted to stay in
immigration detention—even after years of being detained—rather
than be deported because the only medication that helps control the
symptoms of his mental illness is not available in his country of origin.
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit denied his motion for a stay of removal
in a boilerplate denial that said he did not meet the Nken standard. 182
Mr. A was deported several months before oral argument. And, just as
he feared, he now lacks access to medication and is being persecuted
due to his mental illness. If Mr. A prevails in his Tenth Circuit case,
hopefully there will be a way to get him safely back to the United
States—but this remains an open question due to his deteriorating
mental health.
Moreover, it can become difficult for any noncitizen to pursue
their appeal from abroad. Some countries lack the infrastructure to
have reliable access to internet or receive and send mail. 183 It may even
be difficult to maintain contact with retained counsel, or to earn
sufficient money to continue paying retained counsel. Additionally, if
the noncitizen ultimately prevails in their petition for review, returning
to the United States may be impossible, particularly because the U.S.
government’s policies for return are notoriously inadequate. 184
2. Detention
Whether a person is a noncitizen who is being asked to surrender
to immigration authorities, or a criminal appellant, both face the
possibility of imprisonment on surrender. Thus, the purpose of this
subsection is not to say that immigration imprisonment is worse than
criminal imprisonment, although these two systems do differ in certain
ways. Rather, this subsection highlights the realities of immigration
detention that courts have not yet weighed in their decisionmaking
with respect to the doctrine.
Surrendering to immigration authorities at any point during a
case entails much more than simply showing up for an appointment.
Rather, noncitizens may be taken into custody. The INA authorizes
See supra note 9.
See, e.g., Leo Holtz & Chris Heitzig, Figures of the Week: Africa’s Infrastructure Paradox,
BROOKINGS: AFR. FOCUS (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus
/2021/02/24/figures-of-the-week-africas-infrastructure-paradox/
[https://perma.cc
/2QJR-YAG6].
184 Tianyin Luo & Sean Lai McMahon, Victory Denied: After Winning on Appeal, an
Inadequate Return Policy Leaves Immigrants Stranded Abroad, 19 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1061
(2014).
182
183
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the Attorney General to arrest and detain noncitizens while a case is
pending before the immigration courts and BIA. 185 Even when a bond
or parole has been granted, the Attorney General may revoke it “at any
time.” 186 Moreover, noncitizens who have committed or been convicted of certain crimes (including misdemeanors) may be subject to
mandatory detention during their removal proceedings. 187 This results
in people being detained for months or years while their immigration
cases are pending. 188 There is no definite sentence or guarantee of
how long a person will be detained.
If a noncitizen timely appeals an immigration judge’s removal
order to the BIA, 189 then the removal order generally becomes “final”
when the BIA dismisses the appeal. 190 At that point, the statute
provides that the Attorney General “shall remove the alien from the
United States within a period of 90 days.” 191 Moreover, the statute
requires mandatory detention during the 90-day removal period. 192 If
the noncitizen is not removed during the 90-day period, they may
remain detained if they fail to fully cooperate in their removal, 193 or if
they have committed or been convicted of certain crimes. 194 Thus,
particularly when the BIA has already dismissed an appeal, the
noncitizen faces the likelihood of immediate, and potentially lengthy,
detention.

185 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018).
186 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (2018).
187 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018); see also Jorge A. Solis, Note, Detained Without Relief, 10
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 357, 371, 383 n.165 (2019).
188 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer noted that detained class members had spent
from 274 days up to four years in ICE custody before ultimately winning their cases.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 860 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Members of the
relevant classes in the lawsuit numbered in the thousands. Id.
189 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39 provides that an immigration judge’s decision becomes final if
the noncitizen waives their right to appeal or missed the deadline to appeal to the BIA. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.39 (2020). In such cases, the noncitizen is subject to removal immediately.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39 (2020). A circuit court would not be able to hear the petition for
review because the noncitizen would not have exhausted administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d) (2018).
190 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(7), 1241.1. A case might be reviewed by the Attorney General
first before an order becomes final. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).
191 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2018).
192 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2018) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General
shall detain the alien.” (emphasis added)).
193 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) (2018) (providing that noncitizen may remain detained
beyond the 90-day removal period if the person “fails or refuses to make timely application
in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or conspires
or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to an order of removal”).
194 These crimes essentially mirror the pre-removal order mandatory detention
requirements. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2018).
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Immigration detention—supposedly part of the civil immigration
enforcement system—looks a lot like prison. Noncitizens (and sometimes U.S. citizens who are incorrectly alleged to be noncitizens) 195 are
held in a jail-like setting, separated from their families and
communities. 196 Practically speaking, noncitizens are often detained
unexpectedly, giving them no opportunity to figure out childcare,
replace lost income, or pay their bills. 197 Professor César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández’s description of the physical characteristics at the
Port Isabel Detention Center in Texas paints a picture that includes
chain-link fencing, concertina razor wire, layer after layer of
security screenings, and steel doors. Inside, migrants are handed
jumpsuits color-coded to reflect their security classification . . . .
Walking through metal detectors, with the heavy doors clanking
shut behind me, accompanied by a guard and constantly watched
through surveillance cameras, even I—an attorney waiting to meet
a client—seem to pose a risk. 198

Abuse of detainees is rampant in these facilities. In the past two
years, major news stories have broken concerning sexual assault of
detainees by ICE guards, 199 sexual assault of thousands of children in
immigration detention, 200 and horrifying nonconsensual medical

195 Between 2007 and 2015, more than 1,500 U.S. citizens were detained in
immigration detention. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, A Long-Running
Immigration Problem: The Government Sometimes Detains and Deports US Citizens, CONVERSATION
(July 8, 2019), https://theconversation.com/a-long-running-immigration-problem-thegovernment-sometimes-detains-and-deports-us-citizens-119702 [https://perma.cc/ET3EA6RR].
196 Policy Brief: 5 Reasons to End Immigrant Detention, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (Sept.
14,
2020),
https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/policy-brief-5-reasons-endimmigrant-detention [https://perma.cc/N2AB-76WH].
197 See, e.g., SAMANTHA ARTIGA & BARBARA LYONS, KAISER FAM. FOUND., FAMILY
CONSEQUENCES OF DETENTION/DEPORTATION: EFFECTS ON FINANCES, HEALTH, AND WELLBEING 10–12 (2018); Jennifer Baum, Tips for Safety Planning for Children of
Undocumented Parents, A.B.A. (July 12, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2017/safety-planning-for-children-ofundocumented-parents/ [https://perma.cc/928L-98LC]. These are common experiences
reported by the author’s clients.
198 CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S
OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 2–3 (2019). This description is similar to
detention facilities the author has visited in Colorado and California.
199 Lomi Kriel, ICE Guards “Systematically” Sexually Assault Detainees in an El Paso
Detention Center, Lawyers Say, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.propublica.org
/article/ice-guards-systematically-sexually-assault-detainees-in-an-el-paso-detention-centerlawyers-say [https://perma.cc/HVP4-EU73] (stating that federal data showed “14,700
complaints alleging sexual and physical abuse were lodged against ICE between 2010 and
2016”).
200 Richard Gonzales, Sexual Assault of Detained Migrant Children Reported in the
Thousands Since 2015, NPR (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/26/698397631
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procedures including the forced sterilization of women held at a
detention facility in Georgia. 201
In addition to outright abuse, medical care in ICE facilities is
notoriously subpar. A 2018 report by the Human Rights Watch and
other organizations analyzed reviews of detainee deaths and found that
unreasonable delays in medical care, poor levels of care by facility
nurses and doctors, and botched emergency responses due to lack of
appropriate medical equipment or failure to provide adequate care
contributed to the deaths. 202
Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic, all of these
immigration detention conditions have been aggravated. Detainees
have reported that they are given insufficient allotments of soap and
therefore must pay for soap at the commissary with their own money if
they need more. 203 Detained people around the country have resorted
to hunger strikes and pooling their own resources to provide for fellow
detainees who cannot afford to buy soap or food. 204 Especially for the
first several months of the pandemic, detainees and staff alike were not
provided adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) and did not
or could not adhere to social distancing, putting detainees in constant
fear of contracting COVID and entirely powerless to protect
themselves. 205 A report by Physicians for Human Rights noted:
“Symptomatic people were largely kept in the general population,
where they might have potentially exposed others, were rarely tested,
and were threatened with solitary confinement instead of being
provided adequate medical care.” 206 And, in fact, these appalling
conditions have led to disastrous COVID outbreaks in the detention
centers that have spread to the wider community when individuals are
released. 207
/sexual-assault-of-detained-migrant-children-reported-in-the-thousands-since-2015
[https://perma.cc/Q2SL-ZXDK].
201 Kenya Evelyn, At Least 19 Women Allege Medical Abuse at ICE Detention Center in
Georgia, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/23
/georgia-ice-detention-center-women-allege-abuse [https://perma.cc/3EF9-CD29].
202 HUM. RTS. WATCH, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY
SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 45–50 (2018).
203 Jack Herrera, In ICE Detention, Forced to Pay for Soap, NATION (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/coronavirus-ice-detention-soap
[https://
perma.cc/6RHV-FQ4A].
204 Id.
205 Id.; see also PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., PRAYING FOR HAND SOAP AND MASKS:
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION DURING THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC 16–21 (2021).
206 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 205, at 28.
207 A report linked over 245,000 COVID-19 cases back to ICE detention. See generally
DET. WATCH NETWORK, HOTBEDS OF INFECTION: HOW ICE DETENTION CONTRIBUTED TO
THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2020).
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The pandemic has had other effects on detention conditions.
Aside from outright suspensions of family visits, 208 visits from loved
ones are more limited as more people elect to stay home for safety.209
Some lawyers have been completely unable to see their clients in
person during the pandemic. 210 Detainees also reported that food
crews were severely short-staffed, which for a time meant that detainees
were given oatmeal for breakfast and bologna sandwiches for lunch
and dinner. 211 While detrimental to any human being, the diet posed
serious problems for people who had health conditions. Imagine
being told by the detention center doctor that you must eat and avoid
certain foods to control the high blood pressure and pre-diabetes
conditions that showed up in your last medical examination, yet having
no control whatsoever over your diet and being forced to eat unhealthy
foods or starve. 212
It is well-documented that immigration detention is a traumatic
experience. 213 Studies on immigration detention have found that
detainees suffer from “high levels of anxiety, depression and posttraumatic stress disorder. Suicidal ideation and deliberate self-harm
were also common.” 214 Noncitizens also experience depression and
anxiety due to the uncertainty of their position, which is aggravated by
incarceration. 215 Suicides have been reported in ICE facilities. 216 The
208 Camilo Montoya-Galvez, ICE Suspends Family Visits in Detention Centers Amid
Coronavirus Concerns, CBS NEWS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/icebans-family-visits-in-detention-centers-amid-coronavirus-concerns
[https://perma.cc
/XS36-JG82].
209 This is consistent with the experiences of the author’s clients.
210 Justine N. Stefanelli, Detained During a Pandemic: Human Rights Behind Locked Doors,
SOC. SCIS., July 2021, art. 276 at 7–8.
211 These conditions were reported by multiple clients of the author. A detainee who
died of COVID-19 at Otay Mesa Detention Center in California also was reportedly “living
on bologna sandwiches and crackers, the only meal detainees were given for breakfast,
lunch, and dinner,” even though he had “diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart
problems.” Ryan Devereaux, ICE Detainee Who Died of COVID-19 Suffered Horrifying Neglect,
INTERCEPT (May 24, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/24/ice-detentioncoronavirus-death [https://perma.cc/J3ZU-FE59].
212 This scenario is based on one of the author’s current clients.
213 See, e.g., Hannah R. Lustman, Note, Paroling for “Public Benefit”: Amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 to Achieve the Benefits of Discretionary Parole for Asylum Seekers, 29 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y.
221, 234–37 (2020) (summarizing various studies addressing effects of detention on asylum
seekers’ mental health).
214 M. von Werthern, K. Robjant, Z. Chui, R. Schon, L. Ottisova, C. Mason & C. Katona.,
The Impact of Immigration Detention on Mental Health: A Systematic Review, BMC PSYCHIATRY,
Dec. 6, 2018, art. 382 at 2.
215 See id.
216 Maria Sacchetti, ICE Detainee Hanged Himself After Being Taken off Suicide Watch,
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/icedetainee-hanged-himself-after-being-taken-off-suicide-watch/2018/11/28/67a62e74-edb8-
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potential for trauma associated with detention could be heightened
for asylum seekers, who in many cases have suffered traumatic events
in the past. As stated in the von Werthern study, being an asylum
seeker or having greater trauma exposure of any kind (whether torture
or other exposure) prior to detention seems to be associated with
higher rates of anxiety, depression and PTSD in the context of such
detention. 217
One can imagine that immigration detention would be especially
traumatic for asylum seekers who have been previously incarcerated,
especially where incarceration was part of the persecution they
experienced.
Aside from impact on the detained person themselves, detention
of a family member also has traumatic effects on the rest of the family.
Children whose parents have been detained or deported experience
“higher levels of PTSD symptoms” than children whose parents were
undocumented or legal permanent residents with no contact with
immigration enforcement. 218 Where the detained person was the
primary earner, detention creates massive instability in the family
unit. 219 Thus, when noncitizens receive orders to voluntarily report to
immigration authorities, these are among the considerations that run
through their minds.
Now having considered the realities noncitizens face when they
turn themselves in to immigration authorities, and the many reasons
that may influence their decision not to, we turn to examining the
circuit courts’ justifications for dismissing cases under the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine.
B. Limits to Courts’ Inherent Powers
The Supreme Court has proclaimed the existence of powers
inherent to courts that are “governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
11e8-baac-2a674e91502b_story.html [https://perma.cc/XD8Q-U4KS]; Erin Donaghue,
ICE Review Found Failures in Care of Mentally Ill Detainee Who Died by Suicide, CBS News (Aug.
22,
2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jean-carlos-jimenez-joseph-ice-reviewdocumented-failures-in-care-of-mentally-ill-detainee-who-died-by-suicide/ [https://perma
.cc/5QBM-ADA8].
217 Von Werthern et al., supra note 214, at 14.
218 Id. at 13 (citing Lisseth Rojas-Flores, Mari L. Clements, J. Hwang Koo & Judy
London, Trauma and Psychological Distress in Latino Citizen Children Following Parental
Detention and Deportation, 9 PSYCH. TRAUMA: THEORY RSCH. PRACT. POL’Y 352 (2017)); see
also Kalina M. Brabeck & Qingwen Xu, The Impact of Detention and Deportation on Latino
Immigrant Children and Families: A Quantitative Exploration, 32 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCIS. 341, 354–
55 (2010).
219 See Schuyler Ctr. for Analysis & Advocacy, Supporting Immigrant Families Impacted
by Immigration Detention or Deportation 1 (2017).
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achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 220 The Court
has further stated that fugitive disentitlement falls within these
inherent powers—meaning powers that are not expressly granted by
the Constitution or by Congress—necessary to carry out their work. 221
However, it bears examining whether fugitive disentitlement is truly
justified by the courts’ exercise of inherent powers in the immigration
context, particularly where those powers are limited by two main
principles: necessity and reasonableness.
1. Necessity
Inherent powers are those “[c]ertain implied powers . . . which
cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the
exercise of all others.”222 Meaning, the powers must be necessary for
the courts’ performance of their adjudicatory function. 223 These
powers include tools of control such as docket management and
imposition of sanctions. 224
Fugitive disentitlement is not necessary for the courts to perform
their functions in immigration cases. Necessity is only a justification
where the court is managing its own affairs, and not the affairs of other
actors, even other federal courts. For example, in Ortega-Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court rejected applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine
where the appellant had fled during the underlying district court
proceedings but was back in custody during the appeal. 225 The Court
clarified that it is only permissible to dismiss a case when the escape
holds consequences for the appellate process, stating,
Until that time, however, the district court is quite capable of
defending its own jurisdiction. . . . Most obviously, because flight is
a separate offense punishable under the Criminal Code, . . . the
district court can impose a separate sentence that adequately
vindicates the public interest in deterring escape and safeguards
the dignity of the court. 226

220 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
221 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824 (1996).
222 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).
223 “A court’s inherent power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise.”
Degen, 517 U.S. at 829.
224 Stolley, supra note 50, at 752–53 (describing courts’ inherent powers as including
contempt and other sanctions, striking pleadings or evidence, ordering payment of costs,
and default judgment).
225 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 244 (1993).
226 Id. at 247–48.
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Similar to the situation in Ortega-Rodriguez, in circumstances where the
noncitizen petitioner has not failed to comply with any court orders,
the failure to obey orders from the immigration agencies is not directly
related to the appellate process. The agency can impose fines and
imprisonment on a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1253 for failure to
make arrangements to depart the United States. 227 Under the
reasoning in Ortega-Rodriguez, it is not necessary for the courts of
appeals to dismiss the case to preserve their dignity because the
noncitizen has not flouted the appellate process itself. Moreover, the
agency has means of defending itself where alternate sanctions exist.
2. Reasonableness
In addition to the limitation that the exercise of inherent powers
requires necessity, it also requires reasonableness. As Justice Kennedy
wrote in Degen, courts must exercise self-restraint because wielding
judicial power must be a “reasonable response to the problems and
needs that provoke it.”228 There are several reasonableness problems
with fugitive disentitlement in immigration cases.
First, as scholars have noted, a fundamental “problem with the
application of the [fugitive disentitlement] rule in the immigration
context is that the definition of a fugitive is a person who commits a
crime and flees the jurisdiction or hides within the jurisdiction so as
not to be brought to justice.” 229 The Supreme Court has continued to
hold that immigration is a civil system and that “[t]he order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime.”230 Thus, applying this
doctrine in the immigration context further blurs the line between
criminal and immigration proceedings. 231 The lack of adequate
justification demonstrates the unreasonableness of this doctrinal
creep.
Second, as discussed above in Section I.C, the circuit courts have
not rigorously considered the propriety of expanding a criminal
227 See infra subsection II.B.2.
228 Degen, 517 U.S. at 823–24 (first citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 244; and then
citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146–48 (1985)).
229 Hoffman & Modi, supra note 17, at 481 (citing United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d
1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Wishnie, supra note 16, at 744–45 (pointing out the
disconnect in extending the term “fugitive” from people convicted of crimes to violators of
civil immigration law).
230 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); see Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010) (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984))
(recognizing the enmeshment of deportation and criminal proceedings but maintaining
that “removal proceedings are civil in nature”).
231 The increasing overlaps between criminal and immigration law has been referred
to as “crimmigration.” See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime,
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV 367 (2006).
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doctrine into immigration law, nor have they adequately defended it.
The courts have reasoned that heightened statutory and constitutional
protections in criminal proceedings indicate that civil immigration
violators should be entitled to less protection, and that fugitive
disentitlement therefore should apply more liberally in civil cases.232
The flip side of these courts’ reasoning is: where criminal defendants
are afforded greater constitutional and statutory protections,
shouldn’t noncitizens in removal proceedings be afforded a minimum
protection of having their appeal heard at all? Isn’t it that much more
important that noncitizens have this one opportunity for judicial
review, where noncitizens also face deprivations of liberty (immigration detention) and even permanent separation from communities
and families (deportation)? These questions have not been sufficiently
examined by the courts in deciding to extend fugitive disentitlement
to immigration cases. For that reason, the phrase “doctrinal creep” is
appropriate because disentitlement truly crept in without adequate
consideration.
Furthermore, application of fugitive disentitlement is not
defensible because the rationales from the criminal context do not
apply. Degen summarized the justifications for fugitive disentitlement
laid out in the prior criminal cases: (1) When a person cannot be
located, there is no means of enforcing the court’s ruling; (2) Escape
from justice should rightfully disentitle someone from calling upon the
resources of the court to seek justice; (3) Discourages escape and
encourages voluntary surrenders; and (4) Promotes the efficient,
dignified operation of the courts. 233 These justifications largely overlap
with the rationale given in the most frequently cited immigration
fugitive disentitlement cases. Thus, the following sections are divided
into those rationales to discuss each in turn.
a. Enforceability
A common justification courts give for dismissing cases pursuant
to the doctrine is concern over the enforceability of court orders if the
noncitizen is beyond the control of the court. 234 As an initial matter,
it bears repeating that some courts find fugitivity even where the
person’s whereabouts are known. 235 Thus, those courts appear less
concerned with enforceability, since there is no concern in those cases

232 See, e.g., Bar-Levy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS, 990 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1993); Arana
v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 77 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982).
233 Degen, 517 U.S. at 824.
234 See, e.g., Arana, 673 F.2d at 77.
235 See supra subsection I.C.2.
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that the order will not be enforced because the person cannot be
located.
The more difficult question is whether enforceability justifies
dismissal when the person’s whereabouts are unknown to the court
and immigration authorities. But, similar to the question of whether
fugitive disentitlement is necessary for the courts to manage their own
affairs, we also must ask whether fugitive disentitlement is a reasonable
way to manage the courts’ work. 236 As the Second Circuit pointed out,
it is DHS, not the courts, that actually carries out the removal
process. 237 Thus, dismissing a case pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to sanction a noncitizen’s failure to comply with DHS
“conflate[s] disobedience of an executive command with that of a
court order.”238
Moreover, failure to surrender to immigration authorities while
an appeal is pending does not necessarily indicate an intent to ignore
future court orders. Rather, if the noncitizen ultimately lost their case,
perhaps they would surrender. There are a number of plausible
reasons why a person has a greater incentive to surrender after
exhausting their appellate options: (1) they only failed to surrender
because they feared being removed during the pendency of appeal, as
they could lose the ability to pursue their claims from abroad, (2) they
would understand that their claims had been fully considered by an
Article III court and therefore would accept the final resolution
because they have exhausted all levels of review, (3) knowing that they
would be subject to removal at any time with no other hope for review,
they might rather have more control over their departure by
voluntarily surrendering, and (4) they may perceive the court’s
decision as more legitimate—as the first level of judicial review—than
the agency’s rulings and therefore comply with it.
For these reasons, enforceability is not a reasonable basis on which
courts may hang their hats in applying the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine in immigration cases.
b. Punishment
Precluding a noncitizen from agency or judicial review of their
case is unreasonably harsh because other sanctions are already
provided through immigration statutes, as well as by courts’ other
236 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246–47 (1993) (refusing to dismiss
the case pursuant to the doctrine because there were no appellate consequences from flight
during district court proceedings, and “the district court is quite capable of defending its
own jurisdiction”).
237 See Nen Di Wu v. Holder, 646 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).
238 Id.
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procedural rules. Moreover, blocking a noncitizen’s only opportunity
for judicial review is disproportionate punishment because of the high
stakes in immigration matters. In light of the other available sanctions
that are explicitly provided by statute and regulation, it is improper for
federal courts to impose the “most severe” sanction of
disentitlement. 239
As an initial matter, noncitizens are already sufficiently punished
for any failures to comply with immigration authorities. Noncitizens’
failure to comply is already accounted for—with explicit punishments
included—in the statutory and regulatory scheme. Section 1253(a) of
Title 8 provides, under the heading “Penalty for failure to depart,” the
following:
Any alien against whom a final order of removal is outstanding by
reason of being a member of any of the classes described in
section 1227(a) of this title, who . . . willfully fails or refuses to make
timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to the alien’s departure, . . . shall be fined under title 18,
or imprisoned not more than four years (or 10 years if the alien is
a member of any of the classes described in paragraph (1)(E), (2),
(3), or (4) of section 1227(a) of this title), or both. 240

In addition to this broad statutory penalty that applies to any
noncitizen who fails to depart following a final order of removal, the
regulations impose additional punishments for detained noncitizens.
Detained noncitizens may continue to be held in ICE custody beyond
the 90-day removal period if they “fail[ ] or refuse[ ] to make timely
application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to
the alien’s departure.”241 Moreover, as opposed to people who are not
in custody and therefore can continue living their lives in the event of
an adverse decision, noncitizens who are detained are directly under
the control of the government at all times.
Taking Mr. A’s case as an example, if he did not prevail in his
petition for review and continued not complying, he would have either
(1) been deported anyways if his home country accepted him
regardless of his signing the documents; (2) stayed in detention
indefinitely under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(g); and/or (3) been prosecuted
under 8 U.S.C. § 1253. Because the immigration statutory and
regulatory scheme does not contemplate application of the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine, and instead provides other penalties for

239
240
241

See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996).
8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (2018).
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(g)(ii) (2020).
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failure to comply, the Court should not refuse to hear noncitizens’
claims on this basis. 242
And courts themselves have demonstrated that there are other
ways to sanction parties who act in ways that affect the court’s ability to
adjudicate a case. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, if
briefing deadlines are missed, the case may be dismissed for failure to
prosecute the case. 243 Alternatively, the party may not be permitted to
argue at oral argument. 244 Moreover, courts might only preliminarily
dismiss an appeal and give the party thirty days to surrender to the
custody of the United States Marshal to have the appeal reinstated. 245
Additionally, the INA contains no express “duty to surrender,”246
as opposed to a warrant or summons issued in a criminal case. Absent
a “bag-and-baggage” letter telling the noncitizen when to report to
immigration authorities, no actual deadline has been established. 247
Thus, particularly in matters where DHS has not issued a bag and
baggage letter, it is unclear what “order” would have been violated and
sanctions make even less sense.
Furthermore, dismissal is a disproportionately harsh sanction in
immigration cases because it results in deportation. Proportionality is
a longstanding legal principle dating back to at least the Magna Carta
and is “deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence.” 248 As described by Vicki C. Jackson, “[a]ttraction to
proportionality in both the courts and the academy is no surprise,
since an aspiration to proportionate government, as an important
aspect of justice, is implicit in the constitutional design.”249 In
American law, proportionality functions both as a substantive consideration in individual cases as well as a tool of statutory interpretation.
Even though deportation is not categorized as criminal “punishment,”
242 See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (“The test
for whether congressional legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is
simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))).
243 FED. R. APP. P. 31(c) (providing consequences for failure to file a brief).
244 Id.
245 See United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir. 1973).
246 Hoffman & Modi, supra note 17, at 482–85.
247 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2018) (articulating a 90-day period during which the Attorney
General “shall remove” the noncitizen but containing no duty for the noncitizen to
surrender). The Second Circuit has articulated that the issuance of a bag and baggage
letter may trigger the duty to surrender. Qian Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir.
2007) (“Thus, for an alien to become a fugitive, it is not necessary that anything happen
other than a bag-and-baggage letter be issued and the alien not comply with that letter.”).
248 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (finding that a life sentence for passing a
bad check was constitutionally disproportionate and overturning the life sentence).
249 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3105–06 (2015).
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it is still recognized as a severe penalty by the Supreme Court.250 And
penalties must be proportionate to the wrongdoing.
The principle of proportionality has been accepted by the
Supreme Court in the context of the Eighth Amendment. 251 The
principle serves multiple functions, as “the proportionality principle is
one of the most essential limitations in preserving a sense of fairness
in and the integrity of the criminal justice system, and in protecting
the individual from overreaching by the coercive state.” 252 Fatma
Marouf advocates for proportionality in asylum-related cases, arguing:
In the criminal context, the proportionality principle protects a
defendant from being sentenced to a disproportionately long
period of incarceration or receiving the death penalty; in the
refugee context, the proportionality principle would help protect
someone from receiving the disproportionate penalty of being
deported to a country where there is a serious risk of persecution
or death. 253

People who fear persecution and torture in their countries of origin
are especially likely to want to ensure that they have exhausted all
avenues for appeal and judicial review possible. And while outcomes
for asylum-seekers are particularly disastrous, deportation is a harsh
penalty for any noncitizen. For noncitizens who were lawful permanent residents, they stand to lose lawful status and everything they have
attained in the United States, including family, community, and
property. As Justice Brandeis famously commented, deportation
deprives a person of liberty and “may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.” 254
These are extremely harsh consequences, perhaps beyond what
the federal courts initially intended for this doctrine. Moreover, these
punishments are disproportionate to the act of not voluntarily
surrendering to immigration authorities. Especially when considering
proportionality, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is not appropriate
as a sanction in removal cases.

250 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting)) (using the term “penalty”).
Supreme Court Justices Brewer, Field, and Fuller have also expressed their belief that
deportation constitutes punishment. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 733, 759, 763 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting).
251 Maureen Sweeney & Hillary Scholten, Penalty and Proportionality in Deportation for
Crimes, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 11, 13 (2011).
252 Id.
253 Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the Categorical Approach, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1427, 1464–65 (2017).
254 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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c. Deterrence
Much like many other aspects of fugitive disentitlement in
immigration law, the courts do not clearly delineate what they mean
by “deterrence.” One approach would be specific deterrence, 255
meaning that the courts threaten fugitive disentitlement to get
someone to turn themselves in or not repeat the action themselves.
Specific deterrence, in addition to enforceability, was at play in the
early criminal cases where the Supreme Court gave appellants a certain
number of days to surrender or face dismissal. 256 In immigration cases,
however, it appears the courts more often consider general deterrence, 257 since outright dismissal gives no opportunity for the
individual to turn themselves in. Thus, dismissal is largely to make an
example of a noncitizen who does not obey the orders of immigration
authorities as a warning to others.
General deterrence is unlikely to work for certain noncitizens,
most notably asylum seekers. Deterrence is simply not effective where
the consequences of surrendering to immigration authorities (nearcertain detention and deportation) are worse than having a case
dismissed and taking your chances on being caught. This is especially
true for asylum seekers. As stated by Peter Acker,
The torture and persecution that the asylee would face in many
countries is far worse than anything else imaginable, so why under
any circumstances would an alien return to custody to take the
chance (and given the likelihood of pre-decision deportation, the
near certainty) of being returned to these circumstances? No rule
a court could constitutionally come up with could deter flight when
such flight is necessary to prevent imminent persecution and
torture. 258

Moreover, returning to the principle of proportionality, the goal of
deterrence should not outweigh the fact that dismissal is an extremely
harsh sanction that can result in severe losses. 259 For these reasons,
deterrence does not constitute a reasonable justification for extension
of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine into immigration cases.

255 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(4) (1986).
256 Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 98 (1876) (ordering that the petitioner turn
himself in by the first day of the following term, or his case would be dismissed); Allen v.
Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 142 (1897) (stating the court below had given appellant “sixty days,
or until the last day of the term,” to turn himself in before dismissal).
257 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 255, at § 1.5(4).
258 Peter H. Acker, A Critique of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and Why It Should Not
Apply in Certain Immigration Proceedings, ACKER
IMMIGRATION,
http://www.ackerimmigration.com/articles/A_Critique_of_the_Fugitive_Disentitlement_Doctrine_in
_Immigration_Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/27G4-7YZJ].
259 See supra sub-subsection II.B.2.b.

1006

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

d. Dignity
Courts have stated that dismissing cases based on the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine is appropriate because there is a “need for a
sanction to redress the fugitive’s affront to the dignity of the judicial
process.”260 Yet, the appellate process normally does not involve any
participation on the part of the noncitizen. Cases are often submitted
on the briefs, and even when oral argument is permitted, the
noncitizen typically does not need to be present. Additionally, where
individuals are pro se, if they have completely absconded, courts can
dismiss a case through the normal procedures when parties have
missed deadlines or otherwise failed to follow orders. 261
Moreover, arbitrary dismissal of cases also chips away at the dignity
of the judiciary. In Degen, writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
said the following:
[T]he sanction of disentitlement is most severe and so could
disserve the dignitary purposes for which it is invoked. The dignity
of a court derives from the respect accorded its judgments. That
respect is eroded, not enhanced, by too free a recourse to rules
foreclosing consideration of claims on the merits. 262

Stated in the context of a civil case where the Supreme Court struck
down an application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, this
message carries important meaning for immigration cases as well.
Moreover, as the Second Circuit has pointed out, a noncitizen
failing to surrender to immigration authorities does not constitute
flouting the authority of the court. 263 Rather, it constitutes the court
punishing a person for failing to comply with an order of the executive
branch. 264 Such use of fugitive disentitlement as punishment in that
context “would conflate disobedience of an executive command with
that of a court order. Doing that ultimately weakens rather than
protects the court’s unique dignity, which is, after all, the doctrine’s
focus.” 265
Additionally, courts have stated their concerns in terms of desiring
respect for their own decisions, but we should also be concerned about
the dignity of individuals seeking the assistance of the courts. Dignity
is a fundamental aspect of democratic societies because it “constitutes
260 Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Qian Gao v.
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2007)).
261 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 31(c) (providing consequences for failure to file a brief).
262 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996). The Court also concluded that
“the justice would be too rough” in striking Degen’s filings and granting judgment against
him for his failure to participate in all proceedings. Id. at 829.
263 See Nen Di Wu v. Holder, 646 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).
264 Id.
265 Id.
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the first cornerstone in [sic] the edifice of . . . human rights.” 266 The
tone of some fugitive disentitlement cases indicates the courts’ disdain
toward noncitizens who they perceive to be fugitives, particularly in the
use of criminalizing language and accusing them of “gam[ing] the
system.” 267 In reality, noncitizens might be terrified, believe the agency
committed severe injustices, or have any number of other motivations
for not surrendering for detention and deportation that cannot be
reduced to simple malintent.
Punitive invocation of fugitive disentitlement risks stripping
people of meaningful access to a system that is already racialized and
otherwise can be deeply unfair. 268 Ensuring that people are afforded
the basic dignity of having their claims heard does not mean that they
would be beyond consequence. Rather, it ensures access to a venue
intended to provide redress of rights, a cornerstone of democratic
societies. 269
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine as applied in removal
proceedings interferes with fairness in the proceedings as well as the
dignity of the individual. Fuller consideration regarding the principle
of dignity demonstrates that this rationale does not reasonably justify
criminal doctrinal creep into the immigration context.
C. Legislative Intent
Legislation regarding fugitive disentitlement in another area of
law may be instructive in considering the scope of the doctrine that
Congress might find appropriate in the immigration context. In 2000,
Congress passed a fugitive disentitlement statute called the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), which specifically permits use of the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine in civil forfeiture cases. 270 However,
CAFRA only permits disentitlement where the individual is subject to
related criminal proceedings.
The section is titled “Fugitive
disentitlement” and states that “[a] judicial officer may disallow a
person from using the resources of the courts of the United States in
266 Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 38, 46 (2003)).
267 See, e.g., Qian Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Like the criminal
defendant fleeing after his conviction, an alien who fails to comply with an outstanding
notice to surrender is a fugitive from justice.” (citing Bar-Levy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., INS,
990 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1993))).
268 Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 263, 271–72 (1997).
269 See Glensy, supra note 266, at 68–69 (citing Carozza, supra note 266, at 46).
270 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 14(a), 114 Stat.
202, 219 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2466(a) (2018)).
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furtherance of a claim . . . upon a finding that such person”
purposefully evades arrest “in order to avoid criminal prosecution.”271
A potential lesson to draw from the forfeiture statute is that
fugitive disentitlement is truly meant to apply to people who are
attempting to avoid criminal prosecution, not simply civil enforcement. CAFRA specifically states that courts may only dismiss cases
where the person has notice and flees specifically to avoid criminal
prosecution. 272 This indicates that Congress may impose similar
limitations on use of the doctrine for noncitizens in removal
proceedings, at least where there is no related criminal prosecution.
D. Violation of Constitutional Rights
Another gap in courts’ decisions considering whether to apply the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine is whether constitutional rights are
implicated by such a dismissal. As discussed above, the courts’ power
to control their dockets is limited not only by general reasonableness,
but also to the extent that they must not violate constitutional or
statutory rights. 273 Both procedural due process and the right to
petition bear discussion. While the Supreme Court explicitly declined
to consider the due process argument raised by the petitioner in the
civil forfeiture context in Degen, 274 it is unclear whether these
constitutional concerns have been raised in immigration cases with
respect to fugitive disentitlement. These constitutional concerns
should be raised by advocates and examined by the courts moving
forward.
1. Procedural Due Process
Allowing the circuit courts to dismiss an immigration petition for
review without considering the merits raises due process concerns.
Due to the categorization of immigration violations as “civil” in nature,
a host of constitutional protections have been deemed not to apply in
removal proceedings. 275 However, due process is a fundamental

271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 253 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146–48 (1985)).
274 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996) (“We need not, and do not,
intimate a view on whether enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority
would violate due process . . . .”).
275 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984) (explaining that “various
protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation
hearingE,” including that the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments apply to a lesser
extent in immigration proceedings).
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constitutional principle that certainly applies to these proceedings. 276
Due process essentially requires that the proceedings must be
fundamentally fair, 277 including that noncitizens have the right to “a
full and fair hearing.” 278 Noncitizens must have “the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 279 Dismissal
of a case by a circuit court interferes with noncitizens’ ability to be
heard.
While the Supreme Court has not recognized a substantive
constitutional right to seek judicial review of an administrative
decision, noncitizens have a statutory right to appeal an immigration
judge decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 280 Noncitizens
must be advised of their right to appeal to the BIA at the end of a
removal hearing with an immigration judge. 281 Further, noncitizens
have a statutory right to petition the circuit courts for review of certain
issues arising from a final administrative order. 282 Specifically, Article
III courts have jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and
questions of law. 283 Additionally, in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, the
Supreme Court recognized “that where a determination made in an
administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent

276 Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in
Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 633–34 (1990) (“There is no question that
aliens in deportation proceedings are entitled to due process, and the touchstone in this
setting is ‘fundamental fairness.’” (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903))); see also
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77–78 (1976)).
277 Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782–83 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Marlowe v. INS, 457
F.2d 1314, 1315 (9th Cir. 1972)); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 505 (BIA
1980); Matter of Lam, 14 I&N Dec. 168, 170 (BIA 1972); see also Kanstroom, supra note 276,
at 633–34.
278 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011) (citing Matter of M-D-, 23 I&N
Dec. 540, 542 (BIA 2002)).
279 Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Schroeck v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2005)).
280 See Martin S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights While
Preserving the BIA’s Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 294–95 (2007).
281 United States v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 96-50247, 1997 WL 377986, at *1 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 242.19(b) and § 242.21 require immigration judges to advise
noncitizens of right to appeal to the BIA); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (2018) (providing
that immigration judges, when issuing an order of removal, shall inform noncitizens of the
right to appeal).
282 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018) (providing that “constitutional claims or
questions of law” are judicially reviewable). It should be noted, however, that while there
is a statutory right to judicial review, the circuits are split regarding whether the government
is required to give a noncitizen notice of that fact. Darlene C. Goring, A False Sense of Security:
Due Process Failures in Removal Proceedings, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 91, 94–95 (2014) (first quoting
United States v. Lopez-Solis, 503 F. App’x 942, 945–46 (11th Cir. 2013); and then quoting
United States v. Escobar-Garcia, 893 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1990)).
283 Id.
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imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful
[judicial] review of the administrative proceeding.” 284 Thus, the Court
said that there must be some judicial review of decisions from
deportation proceedings available, because the deportation order can
later be used to establish an element of a criminal offense, such as
illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 285
In fact, Congress responded to the Mendoza-Lopez concerns by
adding subsection (d) to § 1326, which provides that noncitizens can
challenge the underlying removal order by showing that: “(1) the alien
exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to
[challenge] the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the
order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for
judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally
unfair.” 286 Accordingly, the government is obligated to ensure noncitizens are not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review if it wishes
to be able to successfully prosecute noncitizens for illegal reentry in
the future.
This shows that the Supreme Court, as well as Congress,
understand that the opportunity of judicial review of a removal order
is critical to the validity of the order. Thus, blocking noncitizens from
judicial review, a procedure to which they have a statutory right,
deprives them of their due process rights to a full and fair hearing and
the right to be heard by a court of law. 287 At the very least, the right to
judicial review of administrative decisions is tied to due process
concerns because any removal order may serve as an element of a
future criminal prosecution.
One other aspect of the Due Process clause is that it includes a
right to defend. 288 Martha B. Stolley argues, “[w]here a person can be
sued, he is entitled to defend himself against that suit.” 289 Because removal proceedings are brought by the government against noncitizens
in order to “regulate the relationship between the state and the
individual,” noncitizens are certainly in the defensive position. 290
Thus, dismissal pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine
284 United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987) (first citing Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114, 121–22 (1946); and then citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 444 (1944), superseded in part by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214).
285 Id. at 837–39.
286 Goring, supra note 282, at 94 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)
(2012)).
287 See Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Schroeck v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2005)).
288 Stolley, supra note 50, at 770.
289 Id. (citing McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870)).
290 Stumpf, supra note 231, at 380.
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interferes with noncitizens’ right to defend themselves from loss of
lawful status or deportation. Courts should consider these potential
due process concerns that counsel against dismissing cases pursuant to
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
2. First Amendment Right to Petition
The First Amendment right to petition is an additional
constitutional right that is potentially at issue when courts dismiss a
case based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The First
Amendment provides that “the people” have a right “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” 291 This provision, often
referred to as the Petition Clause, largely has been understood to
include the right to file a lawsuit. 292 The Supreme Court has also
clarified that the right to petition includes access to the courts. 293
One possible objection to this theory is that, even if there is a right
of access to the courts, there is no similar right to the appellate process.
There are three primary arguments advocates can raise in defense of
the right to petition. First, drawing such a hard line between trial and
appellate proceedings does not promote fairness, as appeals are the
only manner by which certain errors can be corrected. As noted by
one scholar, “[t]he right to petition for the redress of grievances may
well require access to the appellate level where it is necessary to obtain
relief.”294 Second, as discussed below in Part III, petitions for review
filed with the circuit courts are the first level of judicial—as opposed
to executive administrative agency—review. Assuming that the right
to petition extends to all three branches of government, the petition
for review filed with a circuit court is a noncitizen’s first chance to have
their case reviewed by the judicial branch. Third, the circuit courts—
and only the circuit courts—are explicitly permitted by statute to rule
on constitutional issues. 295 How can we say that the right to petition is
not violated if the courts explicitly tasked with reviewing constitutional
violations can simply choose to dismiss a case without considering the
merits?
291 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
292 Benjamin Plener Cover, The First Amendment Right to a Remedy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1741, 1745–46 (2017).
293 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“Certainly
the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” (first citing Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); and then citing Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941))).
294 A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1064
n.61 (1973).
295 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018) (providing that judicial review is permitted with
respect to “constitutional claims or questions of law”).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has raised a potential barrier with
respect to noncitizens’ First Amendment rights. Yet, this subject
deserves inspection and is a potential area for further litigation. In
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court considered
whether the Fourth Amendment applied to a warrantless search of a
Mexican citizen’s home in Mexico while he was in custody in the
United States. 296 Although the case dealt with Fourth Amendment
rights, the Supreme Court, in dicta, called into question the extent to
which noncitizens enjoy First Amendment rights as well. 297 The
majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated that the
phrase “the people” in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments
only refers to those “who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.”298
Justice Brennan dissented, criticizing the majority’s approach by
noting: “Bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would
have been inconsistent with the Drafters’ fundamental conception of
a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government’s conduct with
respect to all whom it seeks to govern.” 299 Justice Brennan saw
Verdugo-Urquidez as one of “the governed,” as the United States
chose to investigate and prosecute him. 300 Justice Brennan’s dissent is
instructive for how the government has a duty to restrain itself and
protect noncitizens’ right to petition, which in turn should counsel
courts not to dismiss cases pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine.
The majority’s analysis in Verdugo-Urquidez is also outdated and, in
some ways, plainly incorrect. As Michael J. Wishnie has noted, the
Court’s originalist approach to construing who was intended to be
protected by these Amendments “recalls some of the most shameful
moments of American legal history,” such as slavery. 301 Moreover,
Wishnie persuasively argues that there is a plethora of historical
evidence that the Petition Clause does in fact protect people in the
United States, whether they are citizens or noncitizens, and whether
they are present lawfully or not. 302
296 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261–62 (1990).
297 Id. at 265 (citing United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)).
298 Id.
299 Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 292.
301 Wishnie, supra note 16, at 681. Other scholars have noted this lurking shameful
history as well. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Against Fascism: Toward a Latcritical Legal
Genealogy, 23 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 233, 252–53 (2020) (discussing Dred Scott’s lawsuit
challenging his enslavement and his subsequent loss because the Supreme Court concluded
he was not one of the people).
302 Wishnie, supra note 16, at 680–711.
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Lastly, the Court’s statement in Verdugo-Urquidez limiting “the
people” to those who have significant connections to the U.S. is quite
vague, which leaves room for interpretation. For example, perhaps a
lawful permanent resident has “sufficient connection” for First
Amendment purposes. 303 Or one could imagine a court finding that a
person who happens to be undocumented, but has lived in the United
States for thirty years, owns a home, and has a U.S. citizen spouse and
children, demonstrates sufficient voluntary connection with this
country.
For all of these reasons, First Amendment rights are potentially
implicated by the fugitive disentitlement doctrine’s reach into
immigration law and should be taken into account by courts
considering whether to apply the doctrine.
III.

POLICY REASONS TO ELIMINATE FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT IN
IMMIGRATION CASES

Aside from courts having exceeded their power by applying the
doctrine to immigration cases as discussed in Part II, there are also
policy reasons why this doctrinal creep should not be permitted.
Critically, circuit courts have not given due consideration to the
unique nature of immigration law when deciding to apply the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. Courts have ignored the necessity of judicial
review of immigration matters, particularly because of the importance
of independent review, and that Article III courts are specially
positioned to oversee administrative action, rule on constitutional
issues, and ensure compliance with international human rights
obligations. Moreover, as a doctrine entirely created by and administered by the courts, abolishing the doctrine is the only way to check
the power of courts that might carry out a miscarriage of justice in the
name of “efficiency.” Proper analysis should lead courts to eliminate
fugitive disentitlement in this context.
A. Preserve Judicial Review of Removal Orders
Judicial review of agency action serves numerous purposes.
Among them are correcting errors, legitimizing agency adjudications,
regulating administrative officers through fear of reversal or through
binding precedent, providing information about agency function to
the public, and providing feedback to the agencies regarding their
303 See, e.g., Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that the speech
of a lawful permanent resident advocating for immigration reform “implicates the apex of
protection under the First Amendment”), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds, sub nom.
Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227 (2020).
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operation. 304 Scholars have also noted the importance of problemsolving oversight functions, meaning that courts provide feedback
from their unique perspective of reviewing large numbers of agency
decisions across the country. 305
The functions that judicial review serves in the immigration
context are paramount. An obviously useful function is that the circuit
courts catch and correct errors in agency decisions. Other functions
of judicial review of removal orders are considered in greater depth
here.
First, the immigration judges and BIA members lack decisional
independence due to the structure of the agencies, so the federal
courts provide the first opportunity for independent review. Courts
ensure the immigration agencies are following statutory and
constitutional authority and thereby also preserve the legitimacy of the
system. Second, the agencies were not designed to address constitutional issues that arise in individual cases, and in fact cannot rule on
constitutional issues with respect to the statutes and regulations that it
interprets. Moreover, Congress has statutorily charged federal courts
with the task of reviewing constitutional issues that arise in agency
proceedings. Third, Article III courts can provide agency oversight by
observing patterns that emerge, whether in that individual circuit or
nationwide. Fourth, courts are in a better position than the immigration agencies to consider whether the United States is complying with
international human rights obligations pertaining to claims raised by
asylum-seekers.
1. Independent Adjudicators Ensure Fairness and Preserve
Legitimacy of the System
Courts have not adequately considered that they are the first
independent adjudicators that will examine an immigration case.
Decisional independence—the ability for individual adjudicators to
make decisions while not influenced by outside pressures—is key to
procedural fairness. Where adjudicators are subjected to influence,
general procedural protections are insufficient to guarantee fairness.
As one article regarding adjudicatory independence explained,
if the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the governmental
body on the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision
will be based on considerations other than the merits as developed

304 Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency
Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2018).
305 See generally id.
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by the evidence. The government would, in effect, be the judge of
its own case. 306

Although they appear and act like judicial bodies, both the
immigration courts and the BIA are bureaucratic sub-agencies within
the executive branch.
Beginning with immigration courts,
immigration judges are attorneys appointed by the Attorney General
of the United States (AG) to serve as “administrative judge[s]” in the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). 307 Moreover, when
cases reach the circuit courts, the attorneys representing the
government are in the Office of Immigration Litigation, which is also
under the AG’s control. 308 Thus, immigration judges, BIA members,
and the “prosecuting” attorneys on appeal to federal courts all serve at
the pleasure of the same boss. The fact that EOIR operates in the
executive branch, within a prosecuting agency, has been widely
criticized. 309
Now we turn to consider the BIA, the appellate body that reviews
appeals of removal orders issued by immigration judges, which is also
part of EOIR. 310 The BIA’s decisions are normally issued by one
member. It also has the option to decide cases in three-member
panels. However, single-member decisions are the norm. For a case
to be heard by a three-member panel, a case must meet one of the
following needs: settle inconsistencies among immigration judges;
establish precedent in construing laws, regulations, or procedures;
review a decision that is not in conformity with the law; resolve a
“major” case or controversy; review immigration judges’ clearly
erroneous factual determinations; reverse a decision; or resolve a
“complex, novel, unusual, or recurring issue of law or fact.” 311
However broad these regulations appear, in practice, three-member
decisions are rare. 312
306 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986).
307 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2018).
308 Appellate Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/civil
/appellate-section [https://perma.cc/T6RE-YSUL].
309 See, e.g., Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of
“Courts,” 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261 (2019); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why
Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3 (2008).
310 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(a)(1), (b) (2020).
311 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(e)(6) (2020).
312 See, e.g., RICHARD M. STANA, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-940, U.S.
ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS
IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 56 (2008) (noting that, for example, in Fiscal Years 2004,
2005, and 2006 91%, 93%, and 92% of all BIA asylum decisions were made by single member
panels, and 9%, 7%, and 8% of all BIA asylum decisions were made by three-member
panels). Interestingly, “a three-member panel of the BIA is seven times more likely to
decide in favor of an immigrant-appellee than a single member is.” David Giza, The Dangers
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Immigration judges are subject to discipline for misconduct and
can be fired. Moreover, the Department of Justice has stated that
“attorneys” (which includes immigration judges) within the
Department are subject to removal or transferring to other
assignments as needed, even without any allegations of misconduct. 313
Thus, there is a pervasive fear that immigration judges can lose their
jobs for ruling against the government. 314 This has led to movement
from the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) to create
an Article I court that would be independent from the executive
branch of the government. 315 It is to be seen whether the proposal will
gain traction.
The Attorney General can hire and fire the attorneys who serve as
BIA adjudicators as well. Like immigration judges, BIA members’
employment is subject to the will of the AG. 316 In 2003, for example,
Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the removal of five
members of the BIA who had some of the highest percentages of
rulings in favor of noncitizens. 317 The outcome was that BIA members
began ruling in favor of the government with greater frequency, 318 and
to this day, the BIA is viewed by many advocates as simply a hurdle in
getting a case to a federal court of appeals where a just outcome might
actually be obtained.
Another indicator of the lack of independence of immigration
adjudicators is that the Attorney General can certify cases to themselves
to issue precedential BIA decisions that are binding on the BIA and
immigration courts. 319 One scholar has noted that Attorneys General
issued a total of fifteen decisions during the eight years of the George
W. Bush administration, whereas the Attorneys General in the Trump
administration published eleven decisions just within the first three
years. 320 As an example of how this referral power can be used, the
Attorney General in the Obama administration had issued a precedential case, Matter of A-R-C-G-, which recognized domestic violence as

of “Streamlining” Immigration: Why Federal Courts of Appeal Should Have Jurisdiction to Review
BIA Streamlining Decisions, 36 B.U. INT’L L.J. 375, 410 (2018) (citing STANA, supra, at 10).
313 See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.3).
314 Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
369, 370 (2006) [hereinafter Legomsky, War on Independence].
315 Marks, supra note 309, at 1, 15.
316 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2020).
317 Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 314, at 376.
318 Id. at 377.
319 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(g), (h)(i) (2020).
320 Karen M. Sams, Comment, Out of the Hands of One: Toward Independence in
Immigration Adjudication, 5 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 85, 98 n.77 (2019).
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potential grounds for asylum. 321 Then, in 2018, former Attorney
General Sessions referred a case called Matter of A-B- to himself, in
which determined that A-R-C-G- was wrongly decided and vacated it,
which had a devastating legal effect for survivors of domestic
violence. 322
A federal district court ruled that the AG’s ruling in Matter of A-Bwas arbitrary and capricious because “there is no legal basis for an
effective categorical ban on domestic violence and gang-related
claims.” 323 The district court found the case inconsistent with the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as
the INA. Two circuit courts also declined to follow A-B-. 324 None of
these courts’ rejections of the A-B- invalidated the decision
nationwide. 325 But, it shows the power of judicial review. Additionally,
because immigration judges and the BIA are bound by rulings in the
jurisdiction in which the case arose, these decisions have an impact for
the many people whose cases arise there.
There have also been examples of misconduct within the
agencies. For example, Stephen H. Legomsky discusses an instance
where a prosecuting attorney who disagreed with an immigration
judge’s ruling called the Chief Immigration Judge ex parte and asked
him to force the immigration judge to rule the other way. 326 Such
examples provide more of a reason why judicial review serves an
important purpose.
Judicial review is necessary to protect against the volatility and
potential arbitrariness of agency actions in the immigration context.
Erwin Chemerinsky spoke generally of the importance of judicial
review for “litigants who have nowhere to turn but the courts—litigants
who are, by definition, unable t[o] harness ‘popular’ authority for

321 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388 (BIA 2014).
322 Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018). Matter of A-B- has since been
vacated by Attorney General Merrick Garland. Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307, 307 (A.G.
2021).
323 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in
part on other grounds sub. nom. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2020)).
324 See Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2020) (declining to follow Matter of A-B); De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that Matter of A-B- did
not categorically preclude the granting of domestic violence-based asylum claims).
325 Where a circuit court vacates or declines or follow a BIA decision, immigration
judges and the BIA are only bound within that circuit. Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25,
31–32 (BIA 1989) (“Where we disagree with a court’s position on a given issue, we decline
to follow it outside the court’s circuit. But, we have historically followed a court’s precedent
in cases arising in that circuit.”).
326 Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 314, at 373.
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their own constitutional interests.” 327 This certainly applies to noncitizens, who are often villainized in the public eye and lack the right to
vote.
Some scholars argue that even federal judges, who go through a
rigorous vetting and appointment process, each bring their own
political leanings and personal values onto the bench and are not
insulated from political influence. 328 While judges are human beings
with ideological leanings, that is partly why circuit court panels—as
opposed to single-member decisions by immigration judges and the
BIA—provide an opportunity for more balanced decisions. Panel
decisions require more collegiality and dialogue between members
and allow for error correction there as well as accounting for some
level of individual bias. 329 Comparatively, individual immigration
judges decide a case at the trial level. By agency design, most BIA
appeals are only heard by one member. Being heard by a panel of
circuit judges is the first opportunity not just for greater adjudicatory
independence of the decisionmakers, but also generally the first
opportunity for review by more than one adjudicator.
Lastly, the appearance of a fair and just system is critical to the
system’s perceived legitimacy. The lack of independence of immigration judges and BIA members means that many noncitizens will be
deported without ever having their case examined by an independent
adjudicator. 330 Yet, as procedural justice theorists explain, both society
and participants in a case must regard a system as having procedures
that sufficiently allow the parties to seek enforcement, or defense of,
their rights in order for the outcome of a legal matter to be considered
legitimate. 331 Studies have shown that, when noncitizens believe the
system is procedurally fair, it increases their perception that
immigration policy is legitimate. 332 This held true in studies concerning unlawful migration to the United States as well as the legal attitudes
of detainees regarding their perceived obligation to obey immigration

327 Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2004) (responding to another scholar’s advancement of a theory of
“popular constitutionalism,” which counsels against judicial review).
328 Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 272, 308–20
(2005) (describing theories of judicial constraint where courts take other branches’ views
into account to maintain legitimacy, avoid backlash such as jurisdiction stripping or budget
cuts, etc.).
329 See id. at 280–90.
330 See Legomsky, War on Independnece, supra note 314, at 384–85.
331 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CALIF. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004).
332 Emily Ryo, Deciding to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 574, 592 (2013) [hereinafter Ryo, Deciding to Cross]; Emily Ryo, Legal Attitudes
of Immigrant Detainees, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 99, 120 (2017) [hereinafter Ryo, Legal Attitudes].
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authorities. 333 Thus, if courts wish for their orders to be obeyed,
enhancing procedural fairness, including ensuring that cases are
reviewed by independent adjudicators, is extremely important.
Petitions for review filed with the circuit courts are the first
opportunity for independent review available to noncitizens in
removal proceedings. Because judicial independence is a critical piece
of a fair and just legal system, judicial review enhances public
perception of legitimacy of the immigration system.
2. Article III Courts Are Specially Equipped to Decide Constitutional
and Statutory Interpretation Issues
The federal courts play a special role in construing statutes and
regulations and determining whether constitutional rights have been
violated. Congress affirmed the importance of these aspects of judicial
review by preserving the jurisdiction of courts to consider constitutional issues and questions of law. 334
Regulations promulgated by a federal agency are binding on that
agency. 335 Thus, it is fairly settled that immigration courts can consider
whether there have been violations of agency regulations, and
remedies might include suppression of evidence or termination of the
proceedings. 336 Immigration judges also rule on limited constitutional
issues, including whether the Fourth or Fifth Amendment was violated
by immigration officials.
However, as the Supreme Court commented in INS v. LopezMendoza, the invocation of such constitutional rights frequently
complicates removal proceedings beyond the issues that normally arise
and may be beyond the expertise of the judges or even the arguing
attorneys. 337 Agencies are designed to provide speedy administrative
review of immigration matters, and litigating constitutional issues
consumes time and resources. The Supreme Court said as much,
commenting:
The INS currently operates a deliberately simple deportation
hearing system, streamlined to permit the quick resolution of very

333 See Ryo, Deciding to Cross, supra note 332, at 574; Ryo, Legal Attitudes, supra note 332,
at 99.
334 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018).
335 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954)
(stating that the BIA and AG are bound by agency regulations).
336 Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 325, 327–28 (BIA 1980) (noting that agencies
must follow their own procedures and considering whether immigration officer violated a
regulation).
337 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984) (declining to extend the
exclusionary rule to removal proceedings without certain aggravating factors).
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large numbers of deportation actions, and it is against this
backdrop that the costs of the exclusionary rule must be assessed. 338

Moreover, the immigration adjudicatory agencies simply are not
designed to address constitutional violations committed by criminal or
immigration enforcement officials. 339 The agencies do not have
authority to rule on the constitutionality of the statutes and regulations
they administer. 340 The limited expertise and hurried nature of
removal proceedings tend to show that the agencies are not adequately
protecting noncitizens’ rights. And the need for rigorous protection
of individuals’ rights should outweigh efficiency concerns.
Article III courts, on the other hand, have the expertise to
consider complex constitutional issues. 341 Although courts frequently
resort to issues of statutory interpretation to construe statutes, courts
occasionally address the constitutionality of certain provisions. 342 One
example is an equal protection challenge to provisions of citizenship
law that discriminate on the basis of gender. 343 Courts also hear
challenges to prolonged detention arising from the mandatory
detention provisions of the immigration statute. 344
Additionally, the judicial branch is tasked with determining
whether administrative agencies have properly interpreted statutes. 345
The Supreme Court has declared that, even where Congress has
plenary power,
the courts had a responsibility to see that statutory authority was not
transgressed, that a reasonable procedure was used in exercising
the authority, and—seemingly also—that human beings were not
unreasonably subjected, even by direction of Congress, to an
uncontrolled official discretion. 346

338 Id.
339 For a thorough examination of heightened immigration enforcement and failure
of procedural deficiencies in the immigration courts to address it, see Chacón, supra note
91.
340 Matter of Cruz de Ortiz, 25 I&N Dec. 601, 605 (BIA 2011).
341 Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 1205, 1210 (1988) [hereinafter Legomsky, Political Asylum].
342 Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485,
498 (2018).
343 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017).
344 See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (interpreting immigration
statute pertaining to mandatory detention; remanding for lower court to consider, inter alia,
argument that statute violates due process).
345 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
(“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”).
346 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390 (1953) (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S.
86 (1903), as the turning point in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding review of
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Moreover, as will be discussed further below in subsection III.B.4,
Article III courts also must ensure that statutes are construed in ways
that do not violate international law. 347 That role is especially
important for asylum seekers.
3. Oversight Function
Article III courts have the opportunity to witness patterns countrywide and solve problems. Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh
Circuit has called out the immigration court for being the “least
competent federal agency,” 348 which he declared has repeatedly
“fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” 349 Scholars
have described the calling-out function of judicial review as part of the
“problem-oriented oversight” that may push administrative agencies to
fix widespread problems. 350 Judge Posner’s criticism makes obvious
the need for oversight, as judicial review not only corrects bad
decisions but gives immigration judges and BIA members incentive to
consider their decisions carefully.
Furthermore, judicial review of the cases that reach the circuit
courts is important because there are so few cases that even make it
that far in the appellate process. Most cases are resolved at the
immigration court level and are never appealed. In 2014–2017, only
9–11% of immigration court cases were appealed to the BIA. 351 There
was a small spike in 2018, where about 17% of cases were appealed to
the BIA. 352 Far fewer matters are appealed to the federal court of
appeals. 353 Rates of legal representation may be a factor in whether
noncitizens appeal. The majority of detained noncitizens go without
legal representation, and most nondetained noncitizens have
representation and are five times more likely to win their cases than

deportation cases). While the author does not condone Hart’s troubling use of a racial slur
for Mexicans in his law review article, the author nonetheless wishes to properly credit
Hart’s discussion on this topic.
347 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that
“an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains”).
348 Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., dissenting).
349 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Niam v.
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2003)) (collecting remands to the immigration
agency).
350 Gelbach & Marcus, supra note 304, at 1145–48.
351 EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL
YEAR 2018, at 40 (2019).
352 Id.
353 Das, supra note 342, at 491–92.
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those who do not. 354 When a case is dismissed without consideration
of the merits, this deprives not only the particular noncitizen of judicial
review of possible agency error in that matter, but also others whose
cases may have been affected by the outcome.
Federal judges’ broad subject matter expertise also has significant
benefits when reviewing immigration cases. Unlike the immigration
adjudication agencies, federal judges hear a broad range of cases and
grapple with issues of statutory interpretation and constitutional law
regularly, which can be used to analogize and take a wider view of
immigration issues. 355 Moreover, whereas immigration judges hear
tragic stories day after day, and therefore may become desensitized to
them, federal judges are positioned to appreciate the seriousness of
the issues at stake. 356
Moreover, the courts also engage the other branches of
government in conversation that has led to a deeper understanding of
procedures that ensure fundamental fairness. This inter-branch
conversation has been critical for due process developments in
immigration matters. 357 Without judicial review, the immigration
agencies in the enforcement branch of the government would have the
sole law-making authority. While congressional oversight functions are
certainly important, generalist federal judges—who have extensive
legal training and expertise analyzing constitutional issues—add
substantially to oversight of the agencies.
Lastly, it also bears mentioning that courts have a duty to carry out
this oversight function by deciding legal issues presented to them. As
Justice Murphy said in Eisler v. United States,
Our country takes pride in requiring of its institutions the
examination and correction of alleged injustice whenever it occurs.
We should not permit an affront of this sort to distract us from the
performance of our constitutional duties. 358

354 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2015) (finding that, between 2007 and 2012,
14% of detained noncitizens, as opposed to 66% of nondetained noncitizens, were
represented by counsel); see also INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL,
ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 3 (2016) (finding that detained noncitizens
were twice as likely to win their cases if they were represented by counsel, and nondetained
noncitizens were nearly five times as likely to win their cases if they had representation).
355 Legomsky, Political Asylum, supra note 341, at 1210.
356 Id.
357 See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1628 (1992); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties”: A Response to Martin, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 237, 258 (1983).
358 Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1949) (per curiam) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
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Courts should not be permitted to avoid the duties assigned by the
Constitution in the name of docket control or efficiency. The issues
raised in immigration petitions for review do not simply affect the
noncitizen in that one case. Rather, the courts are charged with
deciding legal issues, decisions that can clarify the law for all
noncitizens, not simply with respect to the two parties before them. 359
4. Ensure Compliance with International Human Rights Obligations
Asylum seekers may be granted relief if they meet the definition
of a “refugee” provided in the INA, that they are unable or unwilling
to return to their countries of origin “because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”360
Asylum is a discretionary form of relief. However, there are also
mandatory forms of relief, called withholding of removal and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 361 in a separate part of
the INA that prohibit returning someone to their country of origin
(the principle of nonrefoulement 362) if certain conditions are met.
Both withholding of removal and CAT relief are rooted in
international obligations that the United States has agreed to follow by
incorporating them into our immigration laws. 363 Federal courts
ensure that the agencies are interpreting the statutory protections
consistently with congressional intent. 364 Moreover, federal courts
ensure that ambiguous statutes are construed in a way that “would not
violate either U.S. treaty obligations or customary international law.”365
Thus, dismissal of cases pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine contradicts the statute that provides for judicial review of
asylum denials and might violate the international treaty obligation of
nonrefoulement. 366

359 See id. at 195 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about dismissal where
legal issues could be repeated because they raised questions about congressional
procedures).
360 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
361 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2018).
362 See Glossary: Non-refoulement, Eur. Comm’n, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs
/pages/glossary/non-refoulement_en [https://perma.cc/MF95-93RC].
363 See Aleinikoff, supra note 357, at 257–58.
364 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–450 (1987) (rejecting agency’s
interpretation of the asylum standards set by Congress based on the plain language of the
Refugee Act of 1980, the United Nations Protocol, and legislative history).
365 Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive
Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 660 (2007) (describing the
modern Charming Betsy canon articulated in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982)).
366 Hoffman & Modi, supra note 17, at 482–85.
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Moreover, the very nature of asylum means that improper denial
of claims can lead to persecution, torture, and even death. And asylum
seekers cannot vote, which is to say that the courts provide a critical
forum for redress of rights. 367 Issues that arise in asylum cases are not
simply of a discretionary, one-off nature. Rather, potential issues may
affect large numbers of asylum seekers by establishing precedent. For
example, these include: whether the agency applied the correct legal
standard, 368 whether adjudicators adequately considered the evidence
submitted, 369 whether the facts rise to the level of past persecution
required, 370 whether the applicant established membership in a
protected group, 371 as well as issues related to due process. 372
Additionally, challenges to credibility determinations are another
common issue, as evidence of persecution may not be readily available
to asylees, who may not have had time to gather proof. 373
Because cases involving noncitizens who apply for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture may literally mean the difference between life and death, the
principles discussed in the previous sections are paramount. Asylees,
the people who likely have the most to fear from surrendering
themselves and being deported before the circuit courts hear their
cases, are entitled to have their claims adjudicated by federal courts,
independent decisionmakers that are not subject to the will of the
Attorney General. 374
367 Legomsky, Political Asylum, supra note 341, at 1208.
368 See, e.g., Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509–10 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “BIA
failed to recognize that persecutory conduct may have more than one motive”), superseded
by statute on other grounds, Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302, as
recognized in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2009).
369 See, e.g., Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not
disturb a factual finding if it is supported by ‘reasonable, substantial, and probative’
evidence in the record when considered as a whole.”) (quoting Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279,
287 (2d Cir. 2000)); Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur
duty is to guarantee that factual determinations are supported by reasonable, substantial
and probative evidence considering the record as a whole.”) (alteration in original)
(quoting Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004)).
370 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007).
371 See, e.g., Canales-Rivera v. Barr, 948 F.3d 649, 659 (4th Cir. 2020).
372 See, e.g., Camishi v. Holder, 616 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2010).
373 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018) (“Where the trier of fact determines that
the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
reasonably obtain the evidence.”).
374 Legomsky, Political Asylum, supra note 341, at 1209 (“Both actual justice and the
appearance of justice assume paramount importance when, as is true in asylum cases, the
individual interests are great. Our legal system can tolerate occasional unfairness when the
stakes are trivial, but claims that affect truly significant interests demand a more meticulous
brand of justice.”).
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B. Avoid Governmental and Judicial Abuse of Power
Eliminating the fugitive disentitlement doctrine lessens the
potential for governmental abuse of power, both from the agencies as
well as the courts. The simple fact of dismissing a petition for review
of a removal order without considering the merits means that no
Article III court will review the immigration agencies’ decisions. This
heightens the possibility of agency overreach and abuse of power. As
discussed above, the immigration agencies have been singled out as
falling “below the minimum standards of legal justice” and have been
accused of being the least competent agencies. 375 The courts make
“[e]fficient and [e]ffective [m]onitors of [g]overnment [c]onduct.” 376
Judicial review must be preserved to ensure the agency—which is
subject to executive control—is not acting in illegal or unconstitutional
ways. Judicial independence has been described as a mechanism
designed to “protect individuals and minorities from government
persecution and tyrannous majorities alike.” 377 The ability to seek
judicial review may be the only way that a noncitizen facing
deportation gets a fair shake. Because immigration judges and the BIA
lack decisional independence, there is high potential for governmental abuse of power within the immigration enforcement agency.378
The federal courts of appeals therefore provide the only meaningful
review of immigration enforcement that is separate from that branch
of government.
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine itself opens the door to
governmental abuse of power. As discussed above, if noncitizens
surrender to immigration authorities and the circuit court denies a stay
of removal, they can be deported while their case is being considered.
For some noncitizens, it becomes excessively difficult to maintain
contact with courts and their counsel due to international mail delays
and lack of infrastructure in some countries. For other noncitizens,
they may not ever be able to return to the United States, even if they
prevail in their case, due to the government’s refusal to assure
successful return. 379 Thus, the DHS has an incentive to remove people
during the pendency of the appeal, and then move to dismiss the case
if the person fails to maintain contact. On the other hand, DHS can
threaten that if the person does not surrender, it will file a motion to
dismiss based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
375
376
(2009).
377
378
379

See supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text.
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 747–78
Id. at 786.
See supra subsection III.A.1.
Luo & McMahon, supra note 184, at 1062.
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Moreover, the problem with this judicially created, discretionary
doctrine is that there is very little opportunity for oversight of the
courts’ own actions. The only possibilities for review are to file a
motion to reconsider with the same circuit court or petition the U.S.
Supreme Court. As discussed above, the Supreme Court considered
in Degen whether a district court could enter judgment in a civil forfeiture action based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 380 Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy expressed concern over the
amount of power courts can wield. The Justice warned: “[T]here is a
danger of overreaching when one branch of the Government, without
benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to
define its own authority.” 381 Similarly, as noted by Judge Richard
Posner, “Whether judicially made doctrines and decisions are good or
bad may depend . . . on the judges’ cognition and psychology, on how
persons are selected (including self-selected) to be judges, and on the
terms and conditions of judicial employment.” 382 Allowing courts to
define their own authority has created problems in that it has yielded
quite disparate outcomes in different jurisdictions. Abolishing the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine serves the policy objective of checking
the power of the agencies and courts who might execute a miscarriage
of justice in the name of “efficiency.”
A potential challenge to the solution articulated in this Article—
that courts should exercise self-restraint and eliminate their own
exercise of this doctrine—is that courts already have had the
opportunity to fix this problem and have not. This viewpoint was
represented in an article by Kiran H. Griffith, who argued that
Congress should step in to regulate this issue. Griffith argued that a
legislative fix is appropriate because of Congress’s plenary authority
over immigration matters, and because the Supreme Court has
indicated its unwillingness to engage with this issue by declining to
hear Bright v. Holder. 383 Griffith notes that the Court’s refusal to take
up the issue could have been because the Court agreed with such
expansion of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, or because the high
court is unwilling to interfere with Congress’s power. 384
It is a fair point that courts have created the problem and
therefore might not be willing to solve it. However, as laid out in this
Article, fugitive disentitlement simply is not defensible in immigration
cases. Thus, while Congress passing legislation eliminating fugitive
380 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 829 (1996).
381 Id. at 823 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
382 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 5 (2008).
383 Griffith, supra note 14, at 234–35 (discussing Bright v. Holder, 566 U.S. 1021 (2012)
(denying certiorari)).
384 Id.
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disentitlement in immigration cases would be a welcome solution, it
also seems that courts could confront the issues raised in this Article
and come to the same conclusion on their own.
CONCLUSION
Fugitive disentitlement is but one small piece of the puzzle of
immigration enforcement. Nonetheless, it is an important piece
because it is emblematic of the enmeshment of criminal and immigration law and raises questions of governmental power and the role of
judicial review in immigration cases. This doctrine also highlights the
deep unfairness that can result when judicial decisionmaking is not
grounded in the everyday lived experiences of human beings.
The doctrinal creep of fugitive disentitlement from the criminal
context into immigration law is unjustified. Docket management
should not outweigh individuals’ procedural rights, particularly
because removal proceedings—with the ultimate possible outcome of
separating a noncitizen from their family and loved ones, home, and
their property—are a high-stakes process. Moreover, federal courts are
abdicating their responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction assigned to
their tribunal when appeals are dismissed based on this doctrine.
Although courts often owe some level of deference to administrative
agencies, the actions of agencies should still be subject to judicial
review. All of these concerns should counsel the Supreme Court to
eliminate the application of fugitive disentitlement in immigration
cases. Short of that, the circuit courts should act with self-restraint and
halt their practice of wielding judicial power to dismiss noncitizens’
cases based on fugitivity.
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